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Introduction:	  Since	  a	  changed	  regulation	  in	  November	  1,	  2010	  smaller	  businesses	  could	  choose	  if	  they	  
want	   to	   use	   an	   auditor	   or	   not.	   The	   businesses	   that	   may	   have	   free	   audit	   duty	   are	   called	   micro-­‐
enterprises.	  They	  alone	  stand	  for	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  nation	  inaccurate	  taxation.	  	  Our	  view	  has	  been	  that,	  
through	   qualitative	   interviews	   with	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs,	   clarify	   the	   tax	   behavior	   status	   in	   Sweden	  
today.	  The	  study	  aims	   to	  clarify	  how	  their	   tax	  behavior	  has	  changed	  since	  2010	  and	   if	   the	  39	  percent	  
nation	  inaccurate	  taxation	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  abolition	  of	  mandatory	  auditing.	  
Methodology:	   The	   study	   made	   use	   of	   qualitative	   interviews.	   In	   the	   interviews,	   a	   semi-­‐structured	  
interview	   guide	   served	   as	   a	   base,	   but	   the	   respondents	   have	   been	   encouraged	   to	   open	   up	   the	  
discussions.	  The	  study	  has	  been	  structured	  around	  four	  themes	  as	  follows:	  Functions	  of	  accounting	  (the	  
main	   theme),	   principal-­‐agent	   theory,	   legitimacy	   theory	   and	   tax	   compliance.	   The	   study	   follows	   these	  
themes	  through	  the	  sections	  frame	  of	  reference,	  empirical	  results	  and	  analysis.	  	  
Analysis	   and	   Conclusion:	   The	   results	   of	   the	   study	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	  
between	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   the	   Swedish	   Tax	   Agency	   has	   changed	   since	   the	   audit	   requirement	  
was	   abolished	   in	   2010.	   The	   accounting	   knowledge	   in	   the	  micro-­‐enterprises	   has	   been	   reduced.	   Some	  
micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  have	  chosen	  to	  compensate	  for	  this	  by	  buying	  in	  external	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
an	   accounting	   consultant.	   The	   change	   in	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   has	   not	   affected	   the	  micro-­‐
entrepreneur's	  legitimacy	  towards	  the	  STA.	  They	  do	  however	  believe	  that	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  has	  been	  
reduced	  by	  the	  change	  of	  law,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  banks	  and	  investors.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  
proportion	   of	   the	   inaccurate	   taxation	   among	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   in	   Sweden	   has	   increased	   due	   to	   a	  
change	   in	   tax	  behavior.	  Micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  have	  changed	  the	  way	   they	  handle	   their	   tax	   reports	  and	  
accounts,	  i.e.	  not	  the	  tax	  compliance.	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Abbreviations and Terms of use 
STA	  -­‐	  Swedish	  Tax	  Agency.	  	  
VAT	  -­‐	  Value-­‐added	  tax,	  in	  Swedish	  moms.	  	  
Accounting	   consultant:	   Translation	   of	   the	   Swedish	   word	   redovisningkonsult.	   We	   also	   use	   the	   word	  
Accountant	  to	  vary	  the	  language.	  These	  two	  words	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  the	  study.	  	  	  
Auditor:	  Translation	  of	  the	  Swedish	  word	  revisor.	  	  
Swedish	  tax	  law:	  Translation	  of	  the	  Swedish	  word	  skattelagstiftning.	  
Tax	  offensive	  act:	  Translation	  of	  the	  Swedish	  word	  skattebrottslag.	  
Legitimacy:	   This	   word	   is	   used	   to	   discuss	   trust	   and	   confidence	   regarding	   tax	   authorities	   and	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs.	  	  
Micro-­‐enterprises:	  Businesses	  that	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  more	  than	  two	  of	  the	  following	  three	  criteria:	  	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  1:	  Not	  more	  than	  3	  million	  in	  net	  sales	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  2:	  Not	  more	  than	  1,5	  million	  in	  total	  assets	  	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  3:	  Not	  more	  than	  three	  employees.	  
The	  word	  micro-­‐businesses	  will	  be	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  to	  vary	  the	  language.	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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background and discussion 
In	  2006	  the	  government	  set	  up	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  audit	  removal	  of	  small	  incorporated	  businesses.	  
The	  commission's	  mandate	  was	  to	  review	  the	  rules	  and	  provide	  suggestions	  for	  changes	  in	  law.	  Sweden	  
was	  virtually	  alone	   in	   the	  EU	  to	  have	   the	  audit	   requirement	   for	  small	  businesses.	  Hence	   that	   the	  EU's	  
rules	  on	  audit	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  member	  states	  to	  exempt	  smaller	  businesses	  from	  the	  audit.	  	  
If	  Sweden	  were	  to	  follow	  EU	  Directive's	  thresholds,	  a	  turnover	  below	  €12m	  and	  a	  balance	  sheet	  below	  
€6m	   (Directive	  2013/34/EU),	   it	  would	  mean	   that	  97	  percent	  of	  all	   incorporated	  businesses	   in	  Sweden	  
would	  be	  exempt	   from	  the	  audit	   requirement.	  Several	  bodies	   including	   the	  Swedish	  Tax	  Agency	   (STA)	  
and	  FAR	  (the	  Institute	  for	  auditors	  and	  consultants)	  felt	  that	  a	  change	  to	  the	  EU	  limit	  values	  would	  lead	  
to	  too	  much	  change,	  with	  consequences	  difficult	  to	  foresee.	  
In	  the	  proposition,	  "A	  voluntary	  audit"1	  (Proposition	  2009/10:	  204),	  which	  was	  published	  in	  April	  2010,	  
the	  government	  chose	  to	  follow	  respondents'	  proposals	  to	  limit	  thresholds	  values.	  This	  led	  to	  70	  percent	  
of	   all	   incorporated	   businesses	   were	   abolished	   from	   mandatory	   auditing.	   Regulations	   that	   became	  
effective	  November	  1,	  2010	  means	  that	  if	  not	  more	  than	  two	  out	  of	  three	  criteria	  are	  met;	  incorporated	  
businesses	  can	  choose	  not	  to	  use	  an	  auditor.	  The	  criteria	  are	  as	  follows;	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  1:	  Not	  more	  than	  3	  million	  SEK	  in	  net	  sales	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  2:	  Not	  more	  than	  1,5	  million	  SEK	  in	  total	  assets	  	  
-­‐	  Criteria	  3:	  Not	  more	  than	  three	  employees.	  
The	  incorporated	  businesses	  that	  have	  the	  option	  to	  choose	  free	  audit	  and	  comply	  with	  not	  more	  than	  
two	  of	  the	  criteria	  are	  called	  micro-­‐enterprises.	  Enterprises	  may	  overdraw	  more	  than	  two	  of	  the	  criteria	  
for	   a	   single	   year,	   but	   not	   two	   year	   in	   a	   row.	   	   According	   to	   the	   Government	   proposition	   (Proposition	  
2009/10:	  204)	  micro-­‐businesses	  in	  Sweden	  are	  seen	  as	  follows:	  
"In	  many	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  incorporated	  companies	  owners	  and	  their	   leading	  executives	  are	  the	  
same	  people.	  Audit's	  roles	  to	  protect	  the	  owners’	  interests	  are	  less	  than	  in	  larger	  businesses.	  Many	  small	  
businesses	   also	   have	   no	   external	   sources	   of	   funding	   or	   long-­‐term	   creditors,	   why	   the	   audit	   of	   such	  
businesses	  is	  irrelevant	  even	  for	  the	  category	  of	  stakeholders"	  (Proposition	  2009/10:	  204,	  p.66).	  
FAR's	  Secretary	  General	  Dan	  Brännström	  (2012)	  writes	  on	  his	  website	  that	  in	  July	  2012	  there	  were	  353	  
000	  incorporated	  businesses	  that	  had	  free	  audit	  in	  Sweden.	  Out	  of	  these,	  about	  31	  percent	  or	  108	  000	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  Swedish	  “En	  frivillig	  revision”	  
2	  
	  
incorporated	   businesses,	   opted	   out	   of	   their	   auditor.	   Brännström	   has	   received	   the	   data	   from	  
Bolagsverket.	  Among	  the	  newly	  started	  businesses,	  65	  percent	  have	  opted	  to	  have	  an	  auditor.	  
Previous	  research	  based	  on	  the	  audit	  requirement	  abolition	  has	  discussed	  why	  micro-­‐enterprises	  have	  
chosen	   to	   keep	   their	   auditor.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   studies	   show	   that	   many	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   have	  
chosen	  to	  continue	  to	  hire	  an	  accountant	  mainly	  for	  not	  getting	  an	  impaired	  credit	  (DW	  Blackwell	  1998).	  
Senkow,	  Rennie,	  Rennie	  and	  Wong	  (2001)	  state	  in	  their	  study	  that	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  perceived	  
usefulness	   of	   audit	   services	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   cost	   exists.	   According	   to	   the	   study,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	  
greater	  a	  firm's	  perceived	  utility	  of	  the	  audit	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  costs,	  the	  greater	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  
will	  choose	  auditing	  of	  the	  company's	  accounts.	  
According	  to	  a	  survey	  made	  by	  Collis	  (2010)	  one	  of	  several	  identifiers	  for	  if	  a	  company	  choose	  an	  auditor	  
or	   not	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   size	   of	   their	   turnover.	   Further	   Collis	   argues	   that	   it	   may	   be	   because	   the	  
marginal	  cost	  of	  auditing	  decreases	  as	  sales	   increases.	  The	  British	  companies	   that	  were	   the	  subject	  of	  
Collis	  survey	  were	  those	  with	  a	  maximum	  turnover	  of	  £	  4.8m,	  a	  balance	  sheet	  total	  of	  maximum	  £	  2.4m	  
and	  a	  maximum	  of	  50	  employees.	  
The	  removal	  of	   the	  audit	  requirement	  for	  smaller	  companies	  will	  generate	  a	  saving	  of	  914	  million	  
SEK	  for	  small	  businesses	  in	  Sweden	  2012.	  This	  will	  lead	  to	  that	  the	  STA	  will	  change	  their	  routines	  and	  
scrutinize	   in	  particular	  the	  incorporated	  companies	  whose	  declaration	  stating	  that	  they	  do	  not	  use	  
an	  auditor.	  One	  should	  expect	  that	  the	  STA	  will	  give	  priority	  to	  small	  businesses	  in	  the	  future,	  due	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  STA	  have	  limited	  resources.	  This	  may	  mean	  that	  the	  incorporated	  companies	  that	  
have	  an	  auditor	  will	  not	  be	  examined	  as	  hard	  as	  before	  (Ramert	  2010).	  	  
The	  STA	  has	  found	  that	  micro-­‐enterprises	  perceive	  and	  have	  problems	  with	  their	  tax	  preparation.	  They	  
alone	  stand	  for	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  nation	   inaccurate	  taxation.	   It	   is	   the micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  without	  an	  
auditor	  who	  are	  audited	  harder,	  because	  they	  have	  the	  largest	  incorrect	  tax	  reporting	  (STA	  2013).	  
A	  function	  of	  accounting	   is	  to	  report	  the	  tax	  reporting.	  The	  form	  of	   income	  tax	  return	   is	  based	  on	  the	  
business’s	  accounting	  (STA	  2014).	  Which	  tasks	  as	  accounting	  consultants	  today	  perform	  has	  become	  an	  
area	  that	  many	  researchers	  have	  investigated	  and	  the	  results	  are	  different	  from	  various	  researchers	  (De	  
Loo,	  Verstegen	  and	   Swagerman	  2011).	  One	   result	   of	   the	   research	   shows	   that	   accounting	   consultants'	  
duties	   consist	   of	   traditional	   accounting	   tasks,	   such	   as	   bookkeeping	   and	   the	   preparation	   of	   annual	  
accounts	  and	  annual	  report	  (De	  Loo	  et	  al	  2011;	  Verstegen,	  De	  Loo,	  Mol,	  Slagter	  and	  Geerkens	  2007;	  Zoni	  
and	  Merchant	  2007).	  Other	  researchers	  argue	  for	  new	  results,	  which	  say	  that	  accountants	  have	  moved	  
away	  from	  this	  type	  of	  tasks.	  They	  argue	  that	  today	  their	  job	  also	  comprise	  a	  form	  of	  being	  an	  advisor	  
and	  business	   partner	   to	   the	  management.	   This	   by	   supporting	   decision	  making	   regarding	   the	  business	  
(Burns	   and	   Baldvinsdottir	   2005;	   Caglio	   2003).	   A	   third	   research	   shows	   instead	   that	   an	   accounting	  
consultant's	   job	   is	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  other	  two	  research	  results	  show.	  They	  argue	  that	   the	  tasks	  
consist	  of	  both	  the	  traditional	  accounting	  data	  and	  to	  advise	  the	  client	  management	  (Burns	  and	  Vaivio	  
2001;	  De	  Loo	  et	  al	  2011;	  Halling	  2010).	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Audit	  and	  internal	  control	  is	  needed	  due	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  two	  
parties,	   the	   agent	   and	   the	   principal.	   The	   relationship	   can	   be	   described	   as	   it	   is	   the	   principal	   who	  
delegates	  tasks	  to	  the	  agent	  for	  him	  to	  perform	  these.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  does	  not	  always	  do	  
what	  is	  best	  for	  the	  principal,	  but	  also	  think	  about	  what	  is	  most	  beneficial	  for	  him	  personally	  (Jensen	  and	  
Meckling	   1976).	   A	   principal	   cannot	   constantly	   monitor	   an	   agent's	   work.	   Moral	   hazard	   describes	   the	  
problem	  when	   the	  agent	   can	  exploit	   information	  asymmetry	   that	  arises	  between	   the	  parties	   for	   their	  
own	  gain.	  The	  agent	   is	  the	  party	  who	  will	  always	  have	  more	  information	  and	  choose	  how	  it	  should	  be	  
presented	  to	  the	  principal	  (Miller	  2005).	  	  	  
The	  state	  of	  maximum	  efficiency	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	  principal	  and	  agent	  has	  been	   insured	  by	  
the	  auditor's	  independent	  role.	  An	  independent	  party	  reduces	  the	  risk	  of	  shirking	  by	  agents.	  If	  the	  agent	  
is	   acting	   correctly	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   require	   a	   review,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   principal	   has	   no	  
knowledge	   of	   if	   the	   work	   performed	   is	   optimal	   if	   there	   is	   no	   audit	   (Kren	   and	   Kerr	   1993).	  After	   the	  
conditions	  were	  changed	  in	  2010	  it	   is	  today	  possible	  for	  micro-­‐enterprises	  not	  to	  choose	  an	  auditor.	   If	  
the	  auditor,	  as	  an	   independent	  party	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  principal,	  not	  gets	  elected	  there	   is	  a	  
risk	  that	  the	  principal	  loses	  confidence	  in	  the	  agent.	  Hence	  this	  fact	  Pauly	  (1974)	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
reason	  to	  expect	  a	  worse	  outcome	  due	  to	  if	  the	  independent	  party	  is	  eliminated.	  	  
Participants	   in	   an	   experiment,	   regarding	   law	   compliance,	   tended	   to	   be	   less	   compliant	   in	   cases	  where	  
they	   felt	   that	   there	  were	  ways	   to	   circumvent	   laws	   and	   exploit	   information	   asymmetry.	   For	   example,	  
people	   that	   had	  more	   cash	   than	   card	   payments	   in	   their	   activities	   and	   also	   those	  who	   had	   a	   greater	  
understanding	  of	  various	  tax	  deductions.	  Another	  outcome	  from	  the	  experience	  is	  that	  noncompliance	  
is	   counteracted	   most	   if	   the	   risk	   is	   high	   for	   discovery	   (Robben,	   Webley,	   Weigel,	   Wärneryd,	   Kinsey,	  
Hessing	  and	  Scholz	  1990).	  
In	  cases	  where	  the	  tax	  authorities	  treat	  taxpayers	  well	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  compliance.	  Good	  
treatment	  gives	  high	  compliance	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  particular,	   it	   increases	  taxpayers'	  willingness	  to	  pay	  
taxes.	  They	  get	  a	  higher	  tax	  morale	  when	  they	  are	  well	  treated	  by	  the	  authority.	  In	  cases	  when	  the	  tax	  
officials	  act	  improperly	  toward	  taxpayers,	  consider	  them	  as	  'subjects’,	  they	  actively	  respond	  by	  trying	  to	  
avoid	  taxation	  (Frey	  and	  Feld	  2002).	  
It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  decisions	  by	  authorities	  who	  hold	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
complied.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  making	  decisions	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  fair	  (Tyler	  2006).	  An	  additional	  
way	   to	   increase	   legitimacy	   is	   for	   organizations	   to	   give	   voluntarily	   information	   about	   themselves.	   This	  
could	  be	  information	  beyond	  what	  the	  law	  demands	  in	  different	  areas,	  such	  as	  environmental	  liabilities	  






1.2 Purpose and contribution  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   is	   to	  describe	  how	   tax	  behavior	  has	   changed	   in	  micro-­‐enterprises	   since	   the	  
audit	  requirement	  was	  removed	  in	  2010,	  using	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. How has the principal-agent relationship changed since the audit requirement was removed?	  
2. How does a changed principal-agent relationship affect the legitimacy of tax authorities and micro-
entrepreneurs? 	  
The	  questions	  above	  will	   be	  answered	   from	  an	  accounting	  perspective.	  Accounting	   in	   the	   form	  of	   tax	  
reporting	   requires	   that	  entrepreneurs	  do	  not	  exploit	   the	   information	  asymmetry	  between	   themselves	  
and	  the	  tax	  authority.	  It	  requires	  a	  high	  level	  of	  tax	  compliance	  which	  in	  itself	  requires	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
legitimacy.	  Without	   legitimacy	   entrepreneurs	  would	   not	   be	   as	   compliant	   as	   they	   are	   towards	   the	   tax	  











A brief background to the topic is 
presented and is followed by a 
discussion of the problems that 
exist today and our contribution 
to this subject.	  
Introduction	  
	  
This chapter will describe 
relevant theories.	  
	  
Frame	  of	  ref.	  	  
An analysis comparing the frame 






A presentation of the empirical 
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A conclusion is presented in this 
section. A discussion and suggested 
further research follows. 	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2. Frame of reference 
2.1 Introduction 
In	  this	  section	  we	  will	  present	  the	  study's	  theoretical	  framework.	  It	  is	  organized	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
study's	  four	  selected	  themes:	  Accounting,	  principal-­‐agent	  theory,	  legitimacy	  theory	  and	  tax	  compliance.	  
The	   theoretical	   framework	  will	   later	  on,	   in	   the	  analysis,	  be	   compared	   to	   the	  empirical	   findings	  of	   this	  
study.	  In	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section	  we	  present	  an	  analysis	  model	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
2.2 Functions of accounting 
Accounting	   consultants	   today	   perform	   different	   tasks.	   Research	   investigating	   which	   task	   they	   do	  
perform	  differs	   in	   results	   from	  various	   studies	   (De	  Loo,	  Verstegen	  and	  Swagerman	  2011).	  Research	   in	  
this	  area	  goes	  back	  decades	  and	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  more	  recent	  research.	  Hopwood	  (1983)	  writes	  that	  
accounting	  is	  considered	  a	  key	  role	  in	  organizational	  functions.	  It	  is	  used	  to	  assess	  costs	  and	  the	  benefits	  
of	   corporate	   actions,	   financial	   planning	   and	   reporting	  of	   a	   company’s	  performance.	   The	  accounting	   is	  
tightly	   welded	   to	   organizational	   functions,	   and	   used	   to	   set	   the	   modern	   organizations	   functions	   in	  
economic	  terms.	  A	  more	  recent	  study	  today	  shows	  similar	  results.	  De	  Loo	  et	  al	  (2011)	  write	  that	  regular	  
bookkeeping	  and	  preparation	  of	  the	  financial	  reports	  are	  traditional	  accounting	  tasks.	  	  
Another	  function	  of	  accounting	  is	  to	  support	  the	  tax	  reporting.	  The	  form	  for	  income	  tax	  return	  is	  based	  
on	   the	  business’s	  accounting.	  The	   income	  tax	   return	  pronouncement	   is	   then	  used	  while	   filling	  out	   tax	  
forms,	  which	  is	  demanded	  from	  the	  STA	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis	  (STA	  2014).	  A	  business	  shall	  in	  their	  tax	  reports	  
inform	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  external	  accountant	  has	  assisted	  in	  conducting	  the	  business’s	  accounting	  and	  
in	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   annual	   financial	   statements.	   Indication	  must	   also	   be	   given	   to	   whether	   the	  
financial	  statements	  have	  been	  audited	  or	  not	  (Ramert	  2010).	  	  
Accounting	   also	   has	   a	   larger	   and	   wider	   role	   in	   society	   and	   organizations	   than	   the	   direct	   intent	   of	  
accounting.	   Accounting	   in	   action	   thus	   differs	   from	   the	   intended	   functions	   of	   accounting	   (Mellemvik,	  
Monsen	  and	  Olson	  1988).	  When	   the	   accounting	  has	  been	   implemented	   in	   a	   company,	   it	   becomes	  an	  
organizational	  and	  social	  phenomenon.	  It	  is	  then	  used	  by	  many	  operators	  in	  an	  organization	  for	  different	  
intentions	  (Burchell,	  Clubb,	  Hopwood,	  Hughes	  and	  Nahapiet	  1980).	  Mellemvik	  et	  al	   (1988)	  argues	  that	  
one	  of	  the	  accounting’s	  main	  functions	   is	  to	  support	  an	  organization	   legitimacy	  process.	  This	  does	  not	  
correspond	  directly	  with	  the	  intended	  function	  of	  accounting.	  Another	  important	  role	  of	  the	  accounting	  
is	  to	  exert	  control	  over	  behavior	  through	  rules.	  
Other	   research	   argues	   that	   accountants	   today	   have	   more	   of	   an	   advising	   role.	   They	   act	   as	   business	  
partners	  and	  make	  business	  decisions	  (Burns	  and	  Baldvinsdottir	  2005;	  Caglio	  2003).	  Additional	  research	  
claims	   that	   an	   accounting	   consultant’s	   work	   consists	   of	   a	   mix	   of	   traditional	   accounting	   work	   and	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providing	  advice.	  The	  accountant	  thus	  both	  perform	  traditional	  accounting	  services	  as	  bookkeeping	  and	  
preparing	  the	  annual	  reports,	  as	  well	  as	  give	  business	  advice	  (Burns	  and	  Vaivio	  2001;	  De	  Loo	  et	  al	  2011;	  
Halling	  2010).	  	  	  
A	   study	   conducted	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   finds	   that	   the	   environment	   changes	   the	   role	   of	   accountants.	  
Management	  accounting	   in	  addition	  to	  regular	  bookkeeping	  services	  are	   influenced	  by	  changes	  of	   law	  
and	   the	   financial	   status	   of	   the	   organization	   (De	   Loo	   et	   al	   2011).	   The	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	   enterprise	  
resource	   planning	   system	   (ERP-­‐system)	   may	   also	   affect	   the	   role	   of	   the	   accountant.	   An	   ERP-­‐system	  
provides	  accountants	  with	  a	  powerful	  structure	  tool	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  add	  value	  to	  their	  work.	  This	  will	  
lead	  to	  increased	  legitimacy	  towards	  the	  profession	  of	  accountants	  (Caglio	  2003).	  
Small	   business	   owners	   often	   use	   their	   accountant	   as	   an	   advisor	   as	  well	   as	   conducting	   the	   business's	  
bookkeeping	   services.	   However,	   different	   businesses	   utilize	   their	   accounting	   consultant	   for	   business	  
advice	   in	   various	   degrees	   (Gooderham,	   Tobiassen,	   Døving	   and	   Nordhaug	   2004).	   	   The	   role	   of	   the	  
accountant	   therefore	   differs	   in	   different	   businesses.	   But	   traditionally	   the	   accountant’s	   role	   is	   to	   be	  
responsible	  for	  the	  accounting	  (De	  Loo	  et	  al	  2011).	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  small	  business	  and	  the	  accountant	  tends	  to	  be	  long	  term,	  and	  
many	   small	   businesses	   use	   the	   same	   consultant	   from	   the	   business's	   inception.	   This	   regardless	   of	  
whether	   they	   feel	   completely	   satisfied	   with	   their	   accountant	   or	   not.	   However,	   some	   small	   business	  
owners	  think	  that	  they	  lack	  sufficient	  accounting	  knowledge	  to	  determine	  if	  their	  accounting	  consultants	  
are	  doing	  a	  good	  job	  or	  not	  (Marriott	  and	  Marriott	  2000).	  Gooderham	  et	  al	   (2004)	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  
relationship	  between	  a	  small	  business	  and	  its	  bookkeeper	  usually	  goes	  way	  back,	  but	  say	  that	  the	  length	  
of	   the	   relationship	   is	   not	   crucial	   to	   the	   degree	   of	   satisfaction	   experienced	   with	   the	   service	   that	   the	  
consultant	  delivers.	  Confidence	  in	  the	  accountant	  is	  instead	  dependent	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  work.	  	  
Gooderham	   et	   al	   (2004)	   also	   believe	   that	   an	   important	   reason	   for	   small	   businesses	   to	   ask	   for	   advice	  
from	  its	  accountant	   is	  his/her	  ability	  to	  see	  connections	  and	  draw	  conclusions	  based	  on	  the	  business’s	  
accountancy.	   Even	   if	   small	   business	   owners	   have	   low	   confidence	   in	   the	   work	   that	   the	   accountant	  
executes,	  they	  are	  reluctant	  to	  change	  consultant.	  They	  may	  tell	   themselves	  that	  the	  services	  that	  are	  
provided	  for	  them	  are	  adequate.	  The	  owners	  may	  also	  be	  lacking	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  the	  business's	  
books	  to	  be	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  matter.	  	  
Lack	  of	   knowledge	   can	  also	  mean	   that	   small	  businesses	  do	  not	  use	   their	   accounting	   system	   to	   its	   full	  
capacity.	  Marriott	  and	  Marriott	  (2000)	  also	  believe	  this	  results	   in	  a	  knowledge	  gap	  that	  the	  consultant	  
can	  cover.	  The	  study	  also	  showed	  that	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  entrepreneur	  decided	  to	  abolish	  the	  auditor,	  
they	   had	   not	   felt	   that	   the	   benefits	   from	   keeping	   the	   auditor	   measured	   up	   to	   the	   charge.	   Study	  
participants	  also	  expressed	  that	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  is	  used	  more	  to	  provide	  necessary	  information	  
to	  a	  third	  party,	  rather	  than	  to	  provide	  information	  the	  business	  itself	  would	  benefit	  from.	  	  
Accounting	   is	  a	   topic	   that	  may	  not	  receive	  sufficient	  attention	   from	  all	   small	  businesses,	  which	  means	  
that	   you	  miss	   the	   potential	   of	   information	   that	   can	   be	   obtained	   from	   company	   records	   (Salvato	   and	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Moore	   2010).	   It	   may	   also	   occur	   that	   an	   outside	   party,	   such	   as	   a	   bank,	   demands	   reports	   from	   the	  
business	  owner	  when	  he/she	   is	  applying	   for	  a	   loan.	   If	   the	  owner	   is	  not	  capable,	  or	  anyone	  else	   in	   the	  
small	  company,	  to	  provide	  the	  report	  the	  bank	  is	  asking	  for,	  he	  will	  need	  to	  buy	  in	  the	  service	  from	  his	  
accountant.	  But	   for	   the	  owner	  himself,	  who	  has	  paid	   for	   the	   information	  to	  be	  produced,	   the	  analysis	  
may	  be	  considered	  unnecessary	  (Marriott	  and	  Marriott	  2000).	  	  
Marriott	   and	   Marriott	   (2000)	   also	   believe	   that	   many	   small	   business	   owners	   would	   benefit	   by	   hiring	  
financial	   expertise	   from	   an	   accountant.	   However,	   their	   study	   showed	   that	   small	   business	   owners	   are	  
reluctant	   to	  do	   this	  because	  of	   the	  costs	   involved.	   In	  conclusion	   the	  authors	   say	   that	  "The	  Underlying	  
problem	   stems	   from	   Weaknesses	   in	   the	   financial	   awareness	   of	   the	   owner	   managers"	   (Marriott	   and	  
Marriott	  2000,	  p.486).	  	  
For	   a	   small	   business	   to	   be	   interested	   in	   buying	   knowledge	   from	   an	   outside	   consultant,	   such	   as	   his	  
accountant,	   the	  company	  must	  have	  some	   form	  of	   strategic	   intent	  on	  expansion.	  This,	  along	  with	   the	  
ability	   to	   use	   and	   learn	   from	   the	   advice	   the	   accountant	   gives,	   leads	   to	   increased	   capabilities	   in	   the	  
enterprise	  (Gooderham	  et	  al	  2004).	  In	  family	  businesses,	  hire	  of	  knowledge	  leads	  to	  increased	  sales	  and	  
survival.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  accountant	  can	  fill	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  in	  the	  company.	  The	  use	  of	  an	  outside	  
consultant	  therefore	  relates	  positively	  to	  the	  company's	  sales	  growth.	  For	  this	  to	  be	  true	  however,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  that	  a	  good	  strategic	  process	  exists	  within	  the	  company	  (Barbera	  and	  Hasso	  2013).	  
The	  functions	  of	  accounting	  are	  to	  assess	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  corporate	  actions	  and	  financial	  planning	  
Hopwood	  (1983)	  and	  to	  support	  the	  tax	  reports	  demanded	  yearly	  from	  the	  STA	  (2014).	  But	  accounting	  
in	  action	  sometimes	  differs	  from	  the	  intended	  functions	  of	  accounting,	  giving	  accounting	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  
organizations	   than	   the	   direct	   intent.	   Such	   wider	   roles	   are	   for	   example	   to	   support	   an	   organization	  
legitimacy	   process	   and	   exert	   control	   over	   behavior	   through	   rules	   (Mellemvik	   et	   al	   1988).	   Small	  
businesses	  that	  use	  an	  accountant	  to	  conduct	  traditionally	  accounting	  services	  often	  use	  he/she	  as	  an	  
advisor	   as	   well	   (Gooderham	   et	   al	   2004;	   Burns	   and	   Baldvinsdottir	   2005;	   Caglio	   2003).	   An	   important	  
reason	  for	  this	  is	  the	  accountant	  ability	  to	  see	  connections	  and	  draw	  conclusions	  based	  on	  the	  business’s	  
accounting	  (Gooderham	  et	  al	  2004).	  Salvato	  and	  Moore	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  accounting	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  may	  
not	  receive	  sufficient	  attention	  from	  all	  small	  business	  owners,	  which	  means	  that	  you	  miss	  the	  potential	  
of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  company	  records.	  Marriott	  and	  Marriott	  (2000)	  supports	  this	  
and	  says	  that	  lack	  of	  accounting	  knowledge	  in	  businesses	  conducting	  their	  bookkeeping	  without	  the	  use	  
of	  an	  accountant	  can	  result	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  small	  businesses	  do	  not	  use	  their	  accounting	  systems	  to	  their	  
full	  capacity.	  A	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  be	  that	  the	  small	  business	  owner	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  the	  use	  of	  an	  





2.3 Principal-agent theory 
Principal-­‐agent	  theory	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  has	  its	  basis	  in	  economic	  research.	  The	  theory's	  basic	  
model	  assumes	  two	  parties,	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  principal,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  problems	  in	  this	  relationship	  that	  
make	  need	   for	   audit	   and	   internal	   control	   (figure	   2.3.1).	   The	   relationship	   can	  be	  described	   as	   it	   is	   the	  
principal	  who	  delegates	  tasks	  to	  the	  agent	  for	  him	  to	  perform	  these.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  does	  
not	   always	   do	   what	   is	   best	   for	   the	   principal,	   but	   also	   thinks	   about	   what	   is	   most	   beneficial	   for	   him	  
personally	  (Jensen	  and	  Meckling	  1976).	  The	  principal	  can	  however	  control	  the	  agent	  through	  incentives	  
and	  monitoring.	   Principal-­‐agent	   theory	   involves	   components	   as	   self-­‐interest,	   asymmetric	   information	  
and	  contracts:	  	  
• Parties	  acting	  primarily	  by	  self-­‐interest,	  i.e.	  their	  aim	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  other	  party.	  	  
• Asymmetric	  information,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  parties	  can	  distort	  and	  or	  conceal	  information.	  	  
• Both	   parties	   are	   trying	   to	   design	   the	   contract	   so	   that	   it	   is	   as	   beneficial	   as	   possible	   for	  
themselves.	  A	  contract	  also	  helps	  to	  allocate	  risk	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  (Macintosh	  1994).	  	  
Applied	   to	  a	  business	   it	   is	  often	  described	   that	   the	  owner	   is	   the	  principal	  and	   the	  management	   is	   the	  
agent.	  When	  no	  desires	  between	  these	  parties	  are	  consistent,	   it	   is	  difficult	   for	   the	  principal	   to	  control	  
the	  company.	  A	  common	  belief	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  puts	  their	  personal	  goals	  foremost,	  that	  is	  to	  maximize	  
its	  own	  welfare,	  resulting	  in	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest	  with	  the	  owner.	  This	  is	  called	  agent	  problem	  or	  agency	  
cost	  (Hawley,	  Core	  and	  Larcker	  1999).	  There	  is	  no	  perfect	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  but	  there	  are	  options	  
to	  reduce	  agency	  costs.	  A	  common	  solution	  is	  that	  management	  compensation	  is	  added	  to	  the	  business’	  
financial	  performance	  and/or	  stock	  development.	  This	  leads	  to	  that	  the	  parties'	  agendas	  become	  more	  
coherent.	   Furthermore,	   the	   agent	   can	   be	   compensated	   if	   the	   principal	   believes	   that	   the	   financial	  
statements	   are	   reliable	   because	   of	   the	   agent	   who	   helps	   to	   control	   agency	   costs.	   To	   avoid	   the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  self-­‐interest	  in	  the	  company	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  owners	  it	  is	  important	  
that	   the	   internal	   controls	   are	   good.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting,	   however,	   that	   even	   the	   best	   internal	   control	  
system	  may	  fail	  if	  the	  management	  tries	  to	  manipulate	  or	  not	  doing	  their	  responsibilities	  properly.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  vital	  that	  management	  monitors	  its	  contract	  and	  manage	  their	  affairs	  (Mintz	  2005).	  
Often	  the	  agent	  problem	  is	  linked	  directly	  to	  events	  that	  may	  have	  financial	  consequences	  for	  the	  agent.	  
This	  may	   involve,	   for	  example	  that	   the	  agent	  has	  compensation	  that	   is	   linked	  to	  performance	  and	  the	  
agent	  therefore	  chooses	  the	  accounting	  policies	  that	  lead	  to	  maximum	  results	  and	  thus	  to	  a	  maximum	  
compensation.	  The	  principal	  use	  an	  accountant	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  principal's	  interests	  are	  safeguarded	  
and	   that	   the	   agent	   is	   evaluated.	   The	   principal	   uses	   accounting	   information	   to	   determine	   if	   the	   agent	  






It	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  the	  principal	  to	  constantly	  monitor	  the	  agent's	  work.	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  player	  does	  
not	  get	  hit	  fully	  by	  his/her	  own	  action	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  of	  immoral	  behavior.	  Moral	  hazard	  describes	  
the	   problem	  when	   the	   agent	   can	   exploit	   information	   asymmetry	   that	   arises	   between	   the	   parties	   for	  
their	  own	  gain	  (Miller	  2005).	  The	  agent	  is	  the	  party	  who	  will	  always	  have	  more	  information	  and	  choose	  
how	  it	  should	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  principal.	  	  	  
Another	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  arises	  when	  the	  principal	  does	  not	  have	  access	  to	  all	  the	  information	  
available	  when	  the	  decision	  is	  taken.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  principal	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  the	  agent	  
takes	   the	  decision	  which	   is	   the	  best	   (Adams	  1994).	  Scapens	   (1985)	  argues	   that	   the	  state	  of	  maximum	  
efficiency,	  or	  pareto-­‐optimality,	  occurs	  when	  neither	   side	   can	   increase	   their	  wealth	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  
another.	  
Pareto	   optimality	   has	   been	   insured	   by	   the	   auditor's	   independent	   role	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	  
principal	  and	  agent.	  An	  independent	  party	  reduces	  the	  risk	  of	  shirking	  by	  agents.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  it	  
increases	   confidence	   it	   also	   creates	   a	   cost,	   based	   on	  what	   the	   auditor	   charges.	   If	   the	   agent	   is	   acting	  
correctly	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  require	  a	  review,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  principal	  has	  no	  knowledge	  of	  
if	  the	  work	  performed	  is	  optimal	  if	  there	  is	  no	  audit	  (Kren	  and	  Kerr	  1993).	  	  
Daily,	  Dalton	  and	  Cannella	  (2003)	  claim	  that	  individuals	  generally	  act	  in	  their	  own	  interest	  and	  thereby	  
they	  are	  especially	  reluctant	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  interests	  for	  those	  of	  others.	  For	  the	  agent	  to	  not	  distort	  
the	  information	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  to	  the	  principal,	  a	  desire	  for	  an	  auditor	  occurs.	  It	  appears	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
seal	   so	   that	   the	   accounts	   are	   correctly	   performed.	   The	   businesses	   that	   need	   audit	   have	   increased	   in	  
situations	  where	  the	  principals	  in	  the	  form	  of	  bank	  or	  investors	  have	  demanded	  this	  (Seow	  2011).	  	  	  
After	   the	  conditions	  were	  changed	   in	  2010	   it	   is	   today	  possible	   for	  micro-­‐enterprises	  not	   to	  choose	  an	  
auditor.	   If	   the	  auditor,	  as	  an	   independent	  party	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  principal,	  not	  gets	  elected	  
there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  principal	  loses	  confidence	  in	  the	  agent.	  Hence	  this	  fact	  Pauly	  (1974)	  argues	  that	  















2.4 Legitimacy theory 
Both	   businesses	   and	   government	   agencies	   have	   many	   reasons	   for	   seeking	   legitimacy	   by	   the	   outside	  
world.	   What	   is	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   legitimacy	   can	   be	   defined	   in	   different	   ways.	   Tyler	   (2006,	   p.376)	  
writes	  "Legitimation	  refers	  to	  the	  characteristic	  of	  being	  legitimized	  by	  being	  placed	  within	  a	  framework	  
through	   which	   something	   is	   viewed	   as	   right	   and	   proper".	   Why	   one	   would	   want	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	  
legitimate	  by	   the	  outside	  world,	  or	  need	  to	  be	  perceived	  this	  way,	  have	  been	  discussed	  through.	  Two	  
sides	  debate	  the	  need	  of	  legitimacy	  for	  authorities.	  While	  some	  theorists	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
rule	  without	   legitimacy,	  others	  claim	  that	   it	   is	  possible,	  but	  more	  difficult	   than	   if	  one	  holds	   legitimacy	  
from	  different	  stakeholders	  (Tyler	  2006).	  	  	  
While	   assessing	   whether	   a	   measure	   to	   achieve	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   legitimacy	   is	   to	   be	   considered	  
effective,	   one	   should	   have	   the	   reason	   for	   seeking	   legitimacy	   in	   mind.	   There	   are	   different	   types	   of	  
legitimacy	  that	  one	  can	  try	  to	  achieve;	  pragmatic	  legitimacy,	  cognitive	  legitimacy	  and	  moral	  legitimacy.	  
Pragmatic	   legitimacy	   is	   measured	   by	   the	   advantage	   one	   receives	   by	   reaching	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	  
legitimacy	  from	  the	  closest	  stakeholders.	  This	  often	  involves	  direct	  contact	  with	  the	  company’s	  settings.	  
Cognitive	   legitimacy	   is	  based	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	   the	  behavior	   rather	   than	   interest	  or	  evaluation.	  
Moral	   legitimacy	  concerns	  the	  question	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  -­‐	  what's	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do?	  One	  way	  to	  
view	  moral	   legitimacy	   is	  by	  using	  consequential	   legitimacy	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  moral	   legitimacy	   -­‐	  which	  means	  
that	  organizations	  are	   judged	  by	  what	   they	  achieve.	  A	  problem	  with	   this	  way	  of	   judgment	   is	   that	   it	   is	  
difficult	  to	  assess,	  since	  achievements	  are	  valued	  differently	  by	  different	  parties	  (Suchman	  1995).	  	  	  
One	  way	  to	  achieve	  legitimacy	  is	  to	  express	  an	  opinion	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  environment.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  way	  to	  
draw	   attention	   away	   from	   some	   parts	   of	   the	   organization	   which	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   lower	   degree	   of	  
legitimacy,	   and	   help	   maintain	   a	   good	   image	   of	   the	   company	   over	   all	   (Bansal	   and	   Clelland	   2004).	   By	  
possessing	  legitimacy	  it	  will	  also	  be	  easier	  to	  introduce	  new	  decisions	  and	  be	  obeyed.	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  
that	  people	  have	  an	  easier	  time	  accepting	  decisions	  by	  authorities	  who	  hold	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  
This	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   making	   decisions	   that	   are	   perceived	   as	   fair	   (Tyler	   2006).	   No	   organization,	  
however,	  can	  fully	  satisfy	  all	  of	   its	  stakeholders’	   interests,	  as	  various	  parties	  assess	  different	  actions	   in	  
different	  ways.	  The	  management	  of	  an	  organization	  can	  affect	  in	  what	  degree	  company	  activities	  are	  to	  
be	  perceived	  as	  positive	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  (Suchman	  1995).	  	  	  
Tyler	   (2006)	   argues	   that	   justice,	   in	   addition	   to	   help	   create	   legitimacy,	   also	   can	   help	   to	  maintain	   this.	  
More	  instrumental	  theories	  of	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  claim	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  award	  rewards	  and	  
punishments	   is	   what	   gives	   an	   organization	   influence.	   Today	   research	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   an	  
organization	  follows	  fair	  procedures	  to	  hold	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  legitimacy,	  unlike	  earlier	  thoughts	  about	  it	  
being	   the	   specific	   gain	   or	   loss	   of	   a	   decision	   which	   decided	   how	   the	   outside	   world	   perceived	   an	  




An	  additional	   thing	   that	  has	  been	  shown	   to	   increase	   legitimacy	   is	   for	  organizations	   to	  give	  voluntarily	  
information	  about	  themselves,	  for	  example	  information	  beyond	  what	  the	  law	  demands	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  
environmental	   liabilities.	   This	   also	   gives	   the	   company	   the	   ability	   to	   determine	   which	   decisions	   and	  
activities	  which	  has	  been	  conducted	  that	  will	  be	  communicated	  to	  its	  stakeholders	  (Bansal	  and	  Clelland	  
2004).	  
2.5 Tax compliance 
"A	  Purely	  economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  evasion	  gamble	  implies	  that	  most	  individuals	  would	  evade	  if	  they	  are	  
'rational',	  because	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  cheaters	  will	  be	  caught	  and	  penalized".	  	  
(Alm,	  McClelland	  and	  Schulze	  1992,	  p.22)	  	  
As	   old	   as	   taxation	   is,	   as	   old	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   tax	   compliance.	   Calculating	   the	   level	   of	   avoidance	   is	  
difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  Estimates	  in	  Sweden	  show	  that	  six	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  does	  not	  comply	  
with	   tax	   laws	   (STA	  2012).	  Rationally,	   it	   should	  however	  be	  a	  bigger	  problem	   than	   it	   is	  because	  of	   the	  
unlikeliness	  to	  be	  caught	  and	  penalized.	  Hence	  this	  fact	  most	  countries	  have	  a	  low	  deterrence	  (Frey	  and	  
Feld	  2002).	  
In	  cases	  where	  the	  tax	  authorities	  treat	  taxpayers	  well	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  compliance.	  Good	  
treatment	  gives	  high	  compliance	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  particular,	   it	   increases	  taxpayers'	  willingness	  to	  pay	  
taxes.	  They	  get	  higher	   tax	  morale	  when	   they	  are	  well	   treated	  by	   the	  authority.	   In	  cases	  when	   the	   tax	  
officials	  act	  improperly	  toward	  taxpayers,	  consider	  them	  as	  'subjects’,	  they	  actively	  respond	  by	  trying	  to	  
avoid	  taxation	  (Frey	  and	  Feld	  2002).	  
By	   making	   use	   of	   motivational	   factors	   that	   are	   not	   economic	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   an	   anticipated	  
noncompliance	   to	   decrease.	   There	   are	   a	   myriad	   of	   different	   factors	   that	   can	   be	   applied.	   Many	  
psychological	   factors	   can	   affect,	   such	   as	   remorse,	   envy,	   guilt	   and	   shame.	  With	   the	   help	   of	   social	   and	  
moral	  influences,	  these	  factors	  can	  be	  implemented.	  As	  a	  preference	  for	  honesty,	  morale	  can	  be	  cited	  as	  
a	  utilitarian	  welfare	  or	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  rule	  in	  accordance	  with	  Kantianism.	  More	  studies	  are	  needed	  to	  
determine	  which	   of	   these	   factors	   that	   is	  most	   successful	   and	  how	   this	   should	   be	   incorporated	   into	   a	  
standardized	  framework	  (Andreoni,	  Erard	  and	  Feinstein	  1998).	  
By	   using	   a	   sophisticated	   business	   simulation	   model	   on	   participants	   from	   Spain,	   Sweden,	   USA	   and	  
Belgium,	   Robben,	   Webley,	   Weigel,	   Wärneryd,	   Kinsey,	   Hessing	   and	   Scholz	   (1990)	   found	   how	   law	  
compliance	  was	  affected.	  Those	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  experiment	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  compliant	  in	  cases	  
where	  the	  participant	  felt	  that	  there	  were	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  laws	  and	  regulations.	  For	  example,	  people	  
that	   had	   more	   cash	   than	   card	   payments	   in	   their	   activities	   and	   also	   those	   who	   had	   a	   greater	  
understanding	  of	  various	  tax	  deductions.	  Further	  the	  authors	  argue	  that	  noncompliance	  is	  counteracted	  
most	  if	  the	  risk	  is	  high	  for	  discovery.	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In	   the	  U.S.	   criminal	   and	   civil	   penalties	   are	   applied	   to	   taxpayers	  who	  understate	   their	   tax	  preparation.	  
Penalties	  are	  divided	  into	  negligence	  and	  substantial	  understatement	  on	  one	  side	  and	  cases	  of	  fraud	  on	  
the	  other.	  The	  latter	  includes	  intentional	  wrongdoing.	  Penalties	  at	  a	  75	  percent	  rate	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  
payment	   can	   be	   applied	   up	   to	   $100,000.	   Understatement	   and	   negligence	   are	   considered	   as	  
misdemeanors	  and	  punished	  as	  well,	  but	  at	  a	  lower	  rate	  and	  maximum	  $25,000	  (Andreoni	  et	  al	  1998).	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  Swedish	  tax	  law	  the	  one	  who,	  either	  
• otherwise	  than	  orally	  willfully	  makes	  a	  false	  statement	  to	  government	  or	  
• fails	   to	   provide	   the	   authority	   with	   the	   declaration,	   income	   statements	   or	   other	   prescribed	  
information	  
causes	   a	   risk	   of	   tax	   evasion	   or	   incorrectly	   credited	   or	   refunded	   to	   him	   or	   herself	   or	   another,	   §2	   tax	  
offenses	   act.	   Anyone	   who	   voluntarily	   takes	   action	   that	   leads	   to	   the	   tax	   to	   be	   imposed,	   credited	   or	  
refunded	   with	   the	   right	   amount,	   the	   §12	   tax	   offenses	   act,	   does	   not	   get	   convicted	   of	   tax	   offenses.	  
Regarded	  as	  a	  petty	  offense	  taxpayers	  are	  sentenced	  for	  tax	  misdemeanor	  and	  punished	  by	  a	  fine	  under	  
§3	  tax	  offenses	  act.	  If	  a	  tax	  crime	  is	  serious,	  taxpayer	  are	  sentenced	  to	  jail	  for	  at	  least	  six	  months	  and	  up	  
to	  six	  years	  in	  accordance	  with	  §4	  tax	  offenses	  act	  (SFS	  1971:69).	  	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	  2.6.1	  
In	   this	   study	   we	   have	   chosen	   to	   apply	   the	   above	   analysis	   model	   (figure	   2.6.1).	   Our	   main	   topic	   is	  
‘functions	  of	  accounting’	  and	  this	  is	  used	  as	  an	  overlying	  theme	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  of	  this	  study.	  To	  
discuss	  this	  subject	  we	  have	  broaden	  the	  study	  with	  three	  subtopics	  which	  are	  ‘principal-­‐agent	  theory’,	  
‘legitimacy	  theory’	  and	  ‘tax	  compliance’.	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Accounting	  as	  a	  function	  in	  the	  form	  of	  accurate	  tax	  reporting	  requires	  that	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  do	  not	  
exploit	  the	  existing	  information	  asymmetry	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  tax	  authority.	  This	  is	  discussed	  
with	  use	  of	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  theory.	  Principal-­‐agent	  theory	  will	  also	  discuss	  how	  the	  relation	  between	  
the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  and	  the	  STA	  has	  changed	  since	  the	  audit	  removal	  and	  what	  these	  changes	  have	  
led	   to.	   Before	   the	   change	   the	   auditor	   possessed	   knowledge	   and	   this	   is	   no	   longer	   present	   in	   the	  
businesses	   that	   do	   not	   make	   use	   of	   an	   auditor	   anymore.	   To	   not	   take	   advantage	   of	   information	  
asymmetry	  a	  high	  level	  of	  tax	  compliance	  is	  required	  which	  in	  itself	  requires	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  
Frey	  and	  Feld	  (2002)	  argue	  that	  without	  legitimacy	  entrepreneurs	  would	  not	  be	  as	  compliant	  as	  they	  are	  
towards	  the	  tax	  authorities. 
A	  micro-­‐entrepreneur	   has	   full	   visibility	   of	   its	   own	   accountings.	   The	   accounts	   are	   the	  basis	   for	   the	   tax	  
report	   and	   are	   submitted	   to	   the	   tax	   authorities.	   The	   micro-­‐entrepreneur	   will	   always	   have	   more	  
information	   about	   its	   accounts,	   compared	   to	   the	   STA.	   Because	   of	   this,	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   for	   the	  
entrepreneur	  to	  exploit	  the	  information	  asymmetry	  that	  exists	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  
distort	   and/or	   conceal	   information	   that	   is	   submitted	   in	   the	   tax	   report.	   Because	   of	   this,	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  agents	  and	  the	  Swedish	  tax	  agency	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  principal	   in	  
this	  study.	  
Our	  first	  question	  in	  this	  study	  relates	  to	  the	  main	  topic	  accounting	  and	  also	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  theory.	  
Previously,	  the	  relationship	  was	  different	  when	  the	  auditor	  controlled	  the	  accountings,	  and	  reduced	  the	  
risk	  for	  shirking	  (see	  figures	  2.6.2	  and	  2.6.3).	  The	  study	  discusses	  how	  the	  relationship	  and	  information	  














The	   second	   question	   is	   discussed	   via	   accounting,	   tax	   compliance	   and	   legitimacy	   theory.	   When	   the	  
auditor	   was	   removed	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   independent	   party	   between	   the	   STA	   and	   the	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs.	  The	  study	   is	   investigating	  whether	  the	  removal	  of	   the	  auditor	  has	  affected	  how	  micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	   comply	  with	   tax	   laws	  when	   filing	   their	   tax	   report,	  which	   is	  based	  on	   their	   accountings.	  
This	   is	   discussed	   together	  with	   their	   view	   of	   legitimacy	   regarding	   the	   tax	   authorities,	   as	  well	   as	   their	  
confidence	  in	  their	  own	  enterprise.	  A	  high	  legitimacy	  leads	  to	  high	  tax	  compliance	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Frey	  
and	  Feld	  2002).	  
The	  empirical	  section	  and	  the	  analysis	  will	  both	  follow	  the	  same	  order.	  The	  study	  begins	  with	  the	  main	  
topic	   functions	   of	   accounting	   and	   this	   is	   followed	   by	   the	   subtopics	   in	   the	   following	   order;	   principal-­‐








In	   this	   section	   we	   will	   describe	   how	   we	   have	   implemented	   the	   study	   and	   present	   which	   scientific	  
approaches	  we	  have	  used.	  For	  the	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis,	  one	  can	  choose	  different	  methods.	  We	  
will	  describe	  the	  choices	  that	  we	  have	  made	  in	  the	  implementation	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  these.	  We	  will	  
then	  describe	  how	  the	  respondents	  in	  the	  study	  have	  been	  selected	  and	  how	  we	  proceeded	  to	  contact	  
them.	   We	   continue	   by	   describing	   how	   we	   collected	   the	   data	   for	   the	   study	   and	   how	   this	   data	   was	  
analyzed.	  Finally	  we	  make	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  study's	  trustworthiness.	  	  
3.2 Choice of subject  
Our	   topic	   concerns	   a	   possible	   change	   in	   the	   tax	   behavior	   of	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   since	   the	   audit	  
requirement	  was	  abolished,	  from	  a	  micro-­‐entrepreneur’s	  perspective.	  Micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  alone	  stand	  
for	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  nation	  inaccurate	  taxation	  (STA	  2013).	  This	  study	  investigates	  if	  the	  tax	  behavior	  in	  
micro-­‐enterprises	  has	  changed	  since	  the	  abolishment	  of	  mandatory	  audit	  duty.	  Tax	  reports	  are	  based	  in	  
the	  business’s	  accounting	  (STA	  2014).	  To	  investigate	  the	  reason	  behind	  inaccurate	  tax	  reporting	  we	  have	  
therefor	  chosen	  to	  originate	  in	  the	  subject	  of	  accounting.	   
We	  have	  also	  chosen	  to	  do	  the	  study	  from	  a	  user	  perspective.	  That	  means	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  interview	  
micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   that	   today	   have	   chosen	   to	   not	   use	   an	   auditor.	   This	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	   reason	  
behind	  the	  39	  percent	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  micro-­‐enterprises	  (STA	  2013).	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  needed	  to	  talk	  
to	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  to	  get	  their	  views	  on	  the	  possible	  difficulties	  and	  opinions	  of	  the	  change	  of	  law.	   
3.3 Qualitative method  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  chosen	  in	  the	  study,	  interviews	  have	  been	  used.	  A	  qualitative	  approach	  
allows	  the	  researcher	  of	  a	  problem	  to	  look	  deeper	  into	  the	  topic	  (Jacobsen	  2002).	  A	  qualitative	  method,	  
as	  opposed	  to	  a	  quantitative	  method,	  puts	  more	  focus	  on	  the	  respondent's	  views	  of	  the	  topic	  (Bryman	  
and	  Bell	  2007).	   
Audit	  secrecy	  has	  only	  been	  abolished	   in	   four	  years,	  and	   is	   thus	  a	  new	  phenomenon.	   In	   this	  study	  we	  
have	  chosen	  to	  use	  qualitative	  information	  as	  the	  study	  is	  exploratory.	  We	  have	  chosen	  to	  look	  deeply	  
into	   the	   subject	   and	   the	   questions	   discussed	   with	   the	   respondents,	   in	   order	   to	   collect	   as	   much	  
information	   as	   possible.	   This	   way,	   we	   increase	   the	   chance	   of	   obtaining	   the	   information	   needed	   to	  
answer	  the	  study's	  questions,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  find	  any	  information	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  
existing	  research.	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The	   interviews	   conducted	   have	   been	   semi-­‐structured	   but	   based	   on	   a	   structured	   interview	   guide.	   The	  
form	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  base	  during	  the	  conversations.	  This	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  qualitative	  proceedings	  
as	  a	  quantitative	  method	  tend	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  more	  strictly	  basis	  than	  a	  qualitative	  interview	  (Bryman	  
and	  Bell	   2007).	   The	   reason	   the	   interviews	  have	  been	   conducted	  as	   semi-­‐structured	  with	  an	   interview	  
guide	  as	  a	  base	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  certain	  questions	  were	  answered	  (Cohen	  and	  Crabtree	  2006).	  The	  aim	  
has	  also	  been	  to	  encourage	  the	  respondents	  to	  talk	  freely	  and	  decide	  parts	  of	  the	  content.	   
3.4 Structure of the study 
To	  get	  a	  clear	  thread	  through	  the	  study	  and	  be	  able	  to	  easily	  compare	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  with	  
the	  empirical	  basis,	   the	   study	  has	  been	   constructed	   through	   four	   themes:	  Accounting,	  principal-­‐agent	  
theory,	  legitimacy	  theory	  and	  tax	  compliance.	  The	  sections	  Theoretical	  framework,	  Empirical	  results	  and	  
Analysis	  and	  discussion,	  has	  followed	  a	  structure	  around	  these	  four	  themes.	   
While	  deciding	  the	  order	  of	  the	  four	  themes,	  we	  have	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study	  and	  
the	  study's	  questions	  (see	  section	  1.2,	  Purpose	  and	  contribution	  and	  2.6,	  Analysis	  model).	   
The	  purpose	  will	  be	  answered	  by	  the	  study's	  two	  questions.	  These	  are	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  main	  topic	  
functions	  of	   accounting.	   To	  be	   able	   to	  discuss	   the	   subject	  more	  deep	  we	  have	   chosen	   to	   apply	   three	  
subtopics	  which	   in	  order	  are	  principal-­‐agent	   theory,	   legitimacy	   theory	  and	   tax	   compliance.	   The	   topics	  
are	  presented	  with	  the	  main	  topic	  at	  first	  and	  followed	  by	  the	  subtopics	  in	  the	  order	  mentioned.	  This	  is	  
to	   facilitate	  seeing	  similarities	  and	  differences	  and	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  concept	  of	   tax	  behavior	   in	   this	  
study.	   
3.5 Selection of the respondents  
We	  have	  selected	  micro-­‐enterprises	  to	  be	  interviewed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  follow.	  Please	  
note	  that	  the	  variables	  hold	  no	  particular	  order.	   
• It	  should	  be	  an	  incorporated	  business,	   
• The	  business	  should	  not	  use	  an	  auditor,	   
• The	  business	  must	  have	  existed	  for	  at	  least	  three	  years,	   
• Their	  location	  is	  in	  Västra	  Götaland.	   
In	   addition	   to	   these	   criteria	   we	   have	   chosen	   to	   interview	   both	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   who	   employ	   an	  
accounting	   consultant	   and	   those	   who	   manage	   their	   accounts	   themselves.	   We	   interviewed	   five	   from	  
each	  group.	  This	   is	   to	  get	   the	  view	  of	  current	   regulations	   from	  both	  groups,	   to	  be	  able	   to	  understand	  
why	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  alone	  stand	  for	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  nation	  inaccurate	  taxation	  (STA	  2013).	  The	  
purpose	  of	   the	   study	  has	  not	  been	   to	  directly	   compare	   these	   two	  groups,	   but	   to	  make	   sure	  opinions	  
from	  both	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  with	  an	  accountant	  and	  without	  one	  were	  collected.	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The	  requirement	  that	  the	  businesses	  must	  be	  incorporated	  is	  related	  to	  the	  study's	  topic	  based	  on	  the	  
enterprise	   to	   not	   make	   use	   of	   an	   auditor.	   The	   abolition	   of	   the	   mandatory	   auditor	   requirement	   is	  
applicable	  to	  incorporated	  businesses.	  In	  addition,	  the	  businesses’	  financial	  statements	  are	  public,	  which	  
means	  we	  could	  search	  for	  information	  within	  this	  corporate	  group.	  	  
The	  reason	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  study	  businesses	  that	  have	  existed	  for	  at	  least	  three	  years	  is	  that	  we	  want	  
the	   businesses	   to	   have	   had	   time	   to	   form	   an	   opinion	   about	   their	   bookkeeping	   and	   accounting.	   If	   we	  
chose	  a	  too	  newly	  developed	  business,	  we	  would	  risk	  that	  the	  respondents	  failed	  to	  respond	  to	  all	  the	  
questions	   in	   the	   interview	   guide.	  We	   also	   had	   a	   time	   limit	   for	   the	   writing	   of	   the	   study,	   so	   we	   have	  
chosen	   firms	   located	   in	   the	  area	  where	  we	  study,	  Västra	  Götaland.	  This	   to	  make	  sure	  we	  had	   time	  to	  
meet	   all	   respondents	   for	   the	   interviews	   face	   to	   face.	   If	   we	   instead	   had	   chosen	   to	   use	   telephone	  
interviews,	   we	   would	   have	   been	   able	   to	   interview	   firms	   from	   other	   locations	   as	   well.	   But	   we	   have	  
chosen	   not	   to,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   both	   wanted	   to	   attend	   all	   interviews	   and	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	  
misunderstanding	   and	   misinterpretation.	   By	   meeting	   the	   respondents	   in	   real	   life,	   the	   meetings	   also	  
became	  more	   intimate.	   This	  made	   it	   easier	   for	   the	   respondents	   to	   open	   up	   and	   give	   developed	   and	  
editable	  answers,	  and	  to	  express	  themselves	  with	  body	  language.	   
The	  reason	  we	  wanted	  to	  have	  as	  few	  restrictions	  as	  four	  is	  that	  this	  is	  an	  exploratory	  study.	  It	  makes	  us	  
want	  to	  get	  an	  as	  broad	  base	  from	  the	  interviews	  as	  possible.	  By	  simply	  limiting	  the	  essay	  according	  to	  
the	   points	   above,	   we	   have	   managed	   to	   get	   a	   diverse	   group	   and	   most	   likely	   a	   larger	   spectrum	   of	  
opinions.	  A	  disadvantage	  of	  not	  delineate	   the	   respondents	   is	   that	  we	  cannot	   compare	   the	  businesses	  
with	  each	  other	  in	  equal	  measure.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  conscious	  choice,	  and	  we	  find	  that	  we	  get	  more	  out	  
of	  reaching	  out	  to	  different	  types	  of	  industries. 
3.6 How to find and contact respondents  
To	   find	  micro-­‐enterprises	   that	  met	   the	   criteria	  and	   limitations	   that	  we	  have	  chosen	   for	   the	   study,	  we	  
have	  used	  the	  database	  Business	  Retriever.	   In	   this	  one	  can	  make	  a	  choice	  of	  several	  different	  criteria,	  
and	  limit	  the	  range	  of	  net	  turnover	  and	  ratios	  that	  you	  might	  be	  interested	  in.	  We	  inserted	  the	  criteria	  
and	  the	  limitations	  we	  chose	  to	  make	  use	  of	  in	  the	  database	  and	  got	  a	  list	  of	  businesses	  that	  matched	  
our	  search.	  The	  result	  was	  68	  enterprises.	   
From	  this	  list	  we	  searched	  for	  contact	  information	  in	  the	  form	  of	  email	  addresses	  and	  phone	  numbers	  in	  
the	  cases	  that	  we	  were	  missing	  this	  information	  in	  some	  businesses.	  As	  a	  first	  contact,	  we	  compiled	  an	  
introductory	   email	   that	  we	   sent	   out	   to	   all	   businesses	  which	   email	   addresses	  we	   possessed,	   about	   80	  
percent	  of	  the	  matching	  businesses.	  In	  the	  introduction	  email	  we	  gave	  a	  short	  presentation	  of	  ourselves	  
and	  our	  essay	  and	  explained	  what	  kind	  of	  topics	  we	  wished	  to	  discuss	  if	  they	  chose	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
study.	   We	   also	   made	   it	   clear	   their	   participation	   would	   be	   anonymous.	   About	   20	   percent	   of	   the	  
businesses	   contacted	   declined	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   study	   immediately	   after	   the	   first	   contact,	   while	  
about	   five	   percent	   of	   the	   contacted	   respondents	   agreed	   to	   participate	   already	   after	   this	   email.	   The	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other	  respondents	  that	  we	  had	  not	  received	  answers	  from,	  we	  called	  up	  to	  specified	  phone	  number.	  We	  
then	  successively	  filled	  the	  vacancies	  in	  both	  groups	  -­‐	  those	  who	  currently	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  
and	  those	  who	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  –	  until	  we	  got	  hold	  of	  ten	  respondents	  matching	  our	  selection.	  After	  
this	  we	  decided	  when	  and	  where	  to	  meet	  the	  respondents	  via	  phone,	  email	  or	  text.	   
3.7 Table of respondents  
Employ	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  
Age	   Gender	   Line	  of	  business	   Duration	   Business	  startup	   Economic	  education	  
35	   Man	   Construction	   35	  min	   2004	   No	  
41	   Man	   Business	  development	   60	  min	   2002	   High	  school	  education	  
44	   Man	   Research	   30	  min	   2000	   University	  education	  
60	   Woman	   Restaurant	   40	  min	   2008	   No	  
61	   Woman	   Leadership	  training	   45	  min	   1992	   Bookkeeping	  course	  
	  
Do	  not	  employ	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  
Age	   Gender	   Line	  of	  business	   Duration	   Business	  startup	   Economic	  education	  
41	   Woman	   PR/media	   50	  min	   1998	   University	  education	  
43	   Woman	   Dentist	   40	  min	   2001	   Bookkeeping	  course	  
49	   Man	   Plumbing	   60	  min	   2003	   No	  	  
52	   Man	   Hair	  dresser	   45	  min	   1998	   Bookkeeping	  course	  
68	   Man	   Management	   60	  min	   1984	   University	  education	  
	  
The	  interviews	  have	  been	  conducted	  from	  2014-­‐02-­‐25	  to	  2014-­‐03-­‐25.	  	  
3.8 Design of the interview guide  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   interviews	  has	   followed	   the	   interview.	   The	  questions	   are	   designed	   to	   encourage	  
open	  discussions	   in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  deeper	   insight	   into	  the	  respondents'	  views	  on,	  among	  other	  things,	  
their	  tax	  reporting.	  The	  questions	  have	  thus	  been	  mostly	  open,	  and	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  with	  just	  a	  
yes	  or	  a	  no.	  Initially,	  general	  questions	  about	  the	  micro-­‐enterprises'	  management	  and	  general	  routines	  
were	  asked,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  conversation	  started	  and	  get	  a	  background	  view	  of	  the	  enterprise.	  The	  




3.9 Conducting the interviews  
In	  this	  study	  we	  have	  made	  interviews,	  which	  provide	  a	  great	  opportunity	  for	  adapting	  the	  language	  and	  
provides	   flexibility	   during	   the	   discussions.	   The	   interviews	   have	   not	   been	   formalized	   and	   have	   been	  
guided	  much	  by	   the	   interviewee's	  answers.	  This	  has	  meant	   that	   the	   respondent's	   thoughts,	   reasoning	  
and	   sentences	   have	   been	   free,	   and	   we	   have	   thus	   been	   able	   to	   collect	   a	   rich	   material.	   During	   the	  
interviews,	  we	  used	  the	  interview	  guide	  in	  a	  written	  form.	  This	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  got	  the	  answers	  to	  
some	  specific	  questions	  and	  areas,	  such	  as	  our	  four	  themes.	   
During	   the	   interviews	   both	   essay	   writers	   have	   participated	   and	   we	   recorded	   the	   conversations	   to	  
document	  them.	  We	  found	  that	  it	  was	  the	  best	  way	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  concentrate	  and	  listen	  better.	  
Direct	   answers	   to	   the	   questions	   we	   did	   note	   during	   the	   interviews	   in	   order	   to	   get	   some	   raw	   data	  
available	  instantly.	  None	  of	  the	  interviewees	  hesitated	  to	  accept	  to	  be	  recorded	  when	  they	  were	  initially	  
told	  that	  they	  will	  remain	  anonymous.	   
Prior	  to	  the	  meetings,	  we	  asked	  whether	  the	  participants	  wanted	  to	  meet	  at	  their	  office	  or	  at	  the	  School	  
of	  Business,	  Economics	  and	  Law	  at	  Gothenburg	  University.	  All	  have	  chosen	  to	  come	  to	  the	  school	  for	  the	  
interviews.	  The	  meetings	  took	  place	  in	  a	  small	  classroom	  where	  we	  placed	  the	  respondent	  on	  one	  side	  
of	   a	   square	   table	   and	   the	   two	   of	   us	   on	   the	   opposite	   side.	   During	   the	   talks	   we	   offered	   coffee	   and	   a	  
cinnamon	   bun	   to	   create	   a	   pleasant	   atmosphere,	   and	   reduce	   any	   nervousness	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  
interviewee	   if	   possible.	   At	   the	  meetings	  we,	   as	   the	   interviewers,	  wore	   neutral	   clothing	   to	   reduce	   the	  
respondents'	  possible	  biases	  and	  preconceptions.	   
3.10 Information analysis  
The	  information	  from	  the	  interviews	  has	  been	  analyzed	  in	  steps.	  First,	  we	  compiled	  and	  transcribed	  the	  
information	  relayed	  from	  the	  respondents.	  The	  information	  has	  been	  divided	  into	  four	  different	  sections	  
from	  our	   chosen	   themes.	   That	   included	  what	  was	   said	   during	   the	   interviews	   and	   how	   the	   discussion	  
progressed.	  This	  has	  been	  compiled	  in	  this	  study’s	  empirical	  section,	  section	  5.	  Both	  essay	  writers	  have	  
discussed	  and	  read	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  interviews	  to	  avoid	  any	  misunderstandings	  by	  either	  party.	  After	  
this,	  the	  analysis	  and	  empirical	  material	  was	  compared	  with	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  The	  theoretical	  
framework	  has	  been	  based	  mostly	  on	  research	  about	  small	  businesses	  and	  family	  firms,	  since	  research	  
regarding	   our	   subject	   and	  micro-­‐enterprises	   has	   been	   limited.	   The	   reason	  we	   chose	   small	   businesses	  
and	  small	  family	  firms	  is	  that	  these	  are	  similar	  to	  micro-­‐enterprises	  in	  size,	  operations	  and	  regulations.	  
We	   then	   discussed	   the	   comparisons	   and	   analyses.	   Finally,	   the	   data	   was	   compiled	   in	   the	   section	  
Conclusions,	   section	  6.	  This	   section	  also	  answers	   the	  chosen	  questions	   in	   this	   study,	   from	  section	  1.2,	  




3.11 Trustworthiness  
When	  using	  qualitative	  data,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  substrate.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  using	  
various	   criteria.	   Researchers	  who	  use	   qualitative	  methods	   can	  make	   use	   of	   the	   criteria	   reliability	   and	  
validity.	  Guba	  and	  Lincoln	  (1994)	  argue	  that	  one	  should	  use	  other	  criteria,	  criteria	  that	  are	  being	  used	  by	  
quantitative	   researchers.	   They	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   specify	   the	   conditions	   for	   assessing	   the	  
quality	  of	  the	  data	  that	  provide	  an	  alternative	  view	  to	  reliability	  and	  validity.	  Criticism	  that	  there	   is	  an	  
absolute	   truth	   in	   the	   social	   world	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   four	   criteria;	   dependability,	   transferability,	  
conformability	  and	  credibility.	  Together,	  these	  criteria	  form	  an	  image	  of	  trustworthiness,	  which	  will	  be	  
assessed	  in	  this	  study.	   
Guba	   and	   Lincoln	   (1994)	   argue	   that	   in	   order	   to	   meet	   the	   criterion	   of	   dependability,	   as	   a	   parallel	   to	  
reliability,	  the	  researcher	  must	  look	  at	  the	  data	  from	  an	  auditing-­‐perspective.	  This	  means	  that	  complete	  
records	  must	  be	  held	  of	  elections	  of	  respondents,	  the	  approach	  used	  during	  the	  interviews,	  the	  chosen	  
interview	  guide	  and	   the	  design	  of	   the	   study.	  This	   criterion	   is	  met	   in	   this	   study	  by	   the	  method	  section	  
which	  describes	  the	  selected	  approaches	  and	  how	  the	  research	  has	  proceeded.	  All	  conducted	  interviews	  
have	  also	  been	  recorded	  in	  audio.	   
As	  a	  qualitative	  study	  often	  focuses	  on	  an	   intensive	  study	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  respondents,	  often	  with	  
characteristic	   commonalities,	  qualitative	  data	   can	  be	  based	  on	   the	   social	   significances	   in	   the	  group	  of	  
respondents	  which	  has	  been	  examined.	  This	  affects	  transferability	  (Bryman	  and	  Bell	  2007).	   
In	  this	  study,	  transferability	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  limitations	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  while	  choosing	  the	  
respondents.	   For	   example	   certain	   requirements	   are	   that	   the	   respondents	   should	   not	  make	   use	   of	   an	  
auditor	  and	  that	  the	  respondents	  chosen	  are	  practicing	  in	  the	  same	  region	  -­‐	  Västra	  Götaland,	  Sweden.	  
However,	  transferability	  is	  increased	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  study	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  particular	  industry	  or	  
requirement	  of	  time	  regarding	  how	  long	  the	  firm	  has	  existed.	   
Conformability	   in	   a	   study	   is	   achieved	   only	   by	   ensuring	   the	   objectivity	   of	   the	   researcher.	   Complete	  
objectivity	  may	  be	  impossible,	  but	  good	  faith	  should	  be	  applicable	  and	  the	  researcher	  should	  not	  have	  
any	   overly	   clear	   personal	   views	   regarding	   the	   questions	   investigated	   (Bryman	   and	   Bell	   2007).	   In	   this	  
study	   the	  conformability	   is	   strengthen	  by	  a	  clear	  description	  of	   the	  answer	  given	  by	   the	   respondents,	  
and	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  data.	  However,	  all	  quotes	  from	  the	  empirical	  material,	  
which	   are	   contained	   in	   section	   4,	   have	  been	   translated	  by	   the	   authors	   of	   this	   study	   from	  Swedish	   to	  
English.	  This	  may	  affect	  the	  conformability	  since	  it	  allows	  the	  possibility	  for	  misunderstandings.	  To	  avoid	  
this	   both	   essay	   writers	   have	   made	   the	   translations	   together.	   The	   fact	   that	   both	   essay	   writers	   have	  
participated	  in	  the	  interviews	  has	  also	  increased	  the	  conformability	  of	  the	  essay.	   
This	   study	  deals	  with	   sensitive	   information	   such	  as	   tax	  evasion	  and	   tax	   compliance.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	  
respondents	  may	  have	  chosen	  to	  withhold	  information	  during	  the	  interviews	  or	  lied	  in	  their	  responses.	  
We	  have	  tried	  to	  avoid	  this	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	   In	  this	  study,	  all	  the	  respondents	  are	  anonymous	  and	  
during	  the	  interviews	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  create	  a	  comforting	  atmosphere	  to	  encourage	  candor.	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Regarding	  criteria	  credibility,	  credibility	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  reality	  can	  be	  interpreted	  
from	  different	  angles.	  To	  establish	  credibility	  good	  practice	  must	  be	  followed	  (Bryman	  and	  Bell	  2007).	  In	  
this	  study	  the	  credibility	  has	  gained	  more	  validity	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authors	  have	  been	  well-­‐acquainted	  
with	   the	   topic.	   This	   results	   in	   higher	   trustworthiness.	   The	   fact	   that	   our	   respondents	   have	   been	  
conducted	  with	   both	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  with	   an	   accountant	   and	  without	   one	   has	   also	   been	   to	   our	  
advantage.	  This	  has	  ensured	  representativeness	  and	  opinions	  from	  different	  groups.	   
The	  trustworthiness	  of	  this	  study	  may	  therefore	  generally	  been	  seen	  as	   indisputable,	  based	  on	  a	  clear	  
dependability	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  methodology	  section.	  Also,	  the	  group	  of	  respondents	  is	  not	  to	  narrow	  
despite	  a	  clear	  target	  market,	  and	  the	  objectivity	  is	  increased	  through	  descriptions	  of	  how	  the	  findings	  
have	  been	  interpreted	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  high	  number	  of	  interviews	  has	  been	  conducted.	  The	  fact	  that	  
all	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  anonymously	  is	  also	  a	  support	  for	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  study.	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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction  
This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  interview	  material.	  We	  have	  chosen	  to	  divide	  the	  interview	  results	  according	  
to	  the	  four	  themes	  which	  this	  study	  follows.	  We	  have	  divided	  this	  section	  after	  the	  study’s	  four	  themes	  
to	  illustrate	  the	  content	  in	  a	  clear	  way.	  	  
4.2 The role of accounting and external accountants 
As	   previously	   mentioned	   half	   of	   our	   respondents	   use	   an	   external	   accountant	   while	   the	   other	   half	  
manage	   their	   accounting	   themselves.	   During	   the	   interviews	   we	   discussed	   the	   relationship	   between	  
respondents	  and	   their	   consultants,	  with	   the	  group	  currently	  employing	  an	  accountant.	   The	  discussion	  
showed	   that	   two	   of	   ten	   respondents	   have	   changed	   their	   accountant	   since	   starting	   the	   enterprise.	   In	  
both	   cases,	   there	   have	   been	   outside	   circumstances	   that	   have	   caused	   the	   change.	   For	   example,	   one	  
respondent	  had	  earlier	  used	  his	  auditor	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  accountant	  as	  well,	  and	  had	  had	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  
accountant	  in	  2010	  when	  he	  decided	  to	  stop	  using	  an	  auditor.	  No	  respondent	  was	  outright	  dissatisfied	  
with	   their	   accounting	   consultant's	  work.	   However,	   four	   of	   ten	   respondents	   employing	   an	   accountant	  
indicated	  that	  they	  did	  not	  know	  enough	  about	  what	  their	  accountant	  did	  do	  to	  assess	  whether	  his	  job	  
was	   good	   or	   not.	   The	   respondents	   also	   said	   that	   they	   did	   not	   possess	   sufficient	   financial	   knowledge	  
themselves	  to	  judge	  the	  work	  done	  by	  their	  accounting	  consultant.	  	  
"I	   do	   not	   have	   the	   ability	   to	  manage	   the	   business’s	   book-­‐keeping	  myself,	   which	   is	   the	   reason	   I	   use	   a	  
consultant.	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  those	  who	  are	  better	  than	  the	  guy	  that	  I	  employ,	  but	  I	  have	  not	  received	  
any	  complaint	  from	  the	  STA	  so	  he	  must	  be	  doing	  something	  right."	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
To	  not	  have	  received	  any	  complaints	   from	  the	  STA	  seems	  to	  be	  an	   important	   factor	  while	   judging	  the	  
work	  of	  your	  accounting	  consultant,	  according	  to	  the	  respondents.	  Two	  other	  factors	  that	  respondents	  
assessed	  as	  positive	  in	  their	  consultant	  were	  easy	  availability	  and	  agreeable	  treatment.	  	  
The	   respondents	  who	   did	   not	   employ	   an	   accountant	   in	   the	   current	   situation	   indicated	   that	   the	  main	  
reason	   for	   this	   was	   the	   cost	   this	   involved.	   Four	   of	   five	   of	   this	   half	   of	   the	   respondents	   had	   used	   the	  
services	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  earlier.	  They	  had	  stopped	  doing	  so	  when	  they	  felt	  able	  to	  handle	  
their	  accounts	  themselves.	  	  
The	  group	  that	  made	  use	  of	  an	  accountant	  today	  said	  that	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  to	  prepare	  
the	   annual	   financial	   statements	   (financial	   statement	   and	   balance	   sheet),	   tax	   planning	   and	   VAT	  
compliance.	   One	   respondent	   had	   also	   at	   some	   point	   asked	   their	   accountant	   to	   establish	   an	   activity	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report	  requested	  by	  a	  banks	  or	  investor.	  This	  cost	  had	  been	  considered	  as	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  credit	  or	  
acquire	  a	  loan.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  respondents	  who	  had	  done	  this	  had	  used	  the	  generated	  report	  for	  
any	  other	  purpose	  or	  further	  business	  decisions.	  	  
Regarding	   the	   accounting	   knowledge	   that	   the	   respondents	   possess,	   four	   of	   five	   respondents	   who	  
discussed	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  group	  employing	  an	  accountant,	  believed	  that	  the	  accountant	  compensated	  
for	  the	  knowledge	  that	  they	  themselves	  lacked.	  The	  consultant	  thus	  covered	  the	  existing	  knowledge	  gap	  
between	  the	  micro-­‐enterpriser	  and	  his	  consultant.	  	  
In	   the	   group	   not	   employing	   an	   accountant,	   all	   respondents	   indicated	   that	   they	   believed	   that	   an	  
accounting	  consultant	  was	  more	  knowledgeable	  in	  the	  subject	  of	  accounting	  than	  themselves.	  However,	  
three	   in	  the	  group	  believed	  that	  the	  extra	  knowledge	  assimilated	  by	  an	  accountant	  was	  not	  necessary	  
for	  their	  own	  business.	  They	  believed	  that	  their	  business,	  because	  of	   its	  small	  size,	  did	  not	  require	  the	  
same	   amount	   of	   tax	   planning	   as	   a	   large	   enterprise,	   such	   as	   SKF.	   Two	   of	   the	   respondents	   said	   that	   a	  
decision	  regarding	  their	  own	  accounting	  would	  not	  affect	  the	  financial	  outcome	  to	  any	  greater	  extent.	  	  
"It	   costs	   me	  more	   to	   pay	   for	   an	   accountant	   than	   what	   he	   can	   earn	   for	   me	   by	   turning	   numbers	   and	  
manipulate	  the	  financial	  statements.	  While	  in	  a	  large	  enterprise	  an	  accounting	  choices	  may	  make	  a	  huge	  
different	  in	  the	  financial	  statement	  ant	  therefor	  save	  the	  enterprise	  a	  lot	  of	  money,	  maybe	  thousands	  of	  
dollars	  or	  whatever	  currency	  they	  use."	  	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
When	  we	  asked	  the	  respondents	  if	  and	  how	  they	  made	  use	  of	  their	  accounting	  in	  their	  business,	  four	  in	  
the	   group	   who	   employed	   an	   accounting	   consultant	   said	   that	   they	   took	   a	   look	   at	   the	   enterprise’s	  
accountings	  at	  regular	  intervals	  (monthly	  to	  quarterly).	  The	  generated	  report	  could	  then	  be	  used	  for	  tax	  
planning.	  In	  the	  group	  who	  did	  not	  make	  use	  of	  an	  accountant,	  bookkeeping	  was	  used	  for	  preparation	  of	  
the	  financial	  statements	  and	  tax	  accounting	  annually.	  Only	  one	  respondent	  in	  this	  group	  would	  look	  at	  
the	  accounts	  before	  making	  tax	  decisions.	  	  
While	   discussing	   regulations	   concerning	   accounting	   and	   bookkeeping,	   eight	   of	   ten	   respondents	  
considered	   the	   updates	   in	   the	   regulations	   to	   be	   constant	   difficult	   to	   keep	   track	   of.	   They	   seemed	   to	  
believe	   that	   there	   could	   be	   rules	   that	   could	   be	   favorable	   for	   them	   as	  micro-­‐enterprisers	   to	   use,	   but	  
which	  they	  were	  unaware	  of.	  This	  belief	  was	  expressed	  in	  both	  different	  groups.	  	  
"There	   are	   probably	  more	   that	   I	   can	   do…,"	   a	   respondent	   from	   the	   group	  without	   an	   accountant	   said,	  
"…but	  it	  would	  take	  me	  too	  long	  and	  be	  too	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  rules	  favorable	  for	  me	  to	  be	  worth	  my	  time."	  	  




4.3 The relation between micro-entrepreneurs and the Swedish Tax 
Agency  
During	   the	   interviews	   the	   discussions,	  which	   have	   addressed	   the	   relationship	   between	   entrepreneurs	  
and	  the	  STA,	  have	  been	  interesting	  and	  rewarding	  to	  this	  study.	  Historically,	  business	  owners,	  especially	  
small	   business	   owners,	   have	   been	   quite	   unconcerned	   with	   the	   relationship.	   They	   have	   not	   had	   any	  
further	  contact	  with	  the	  tax	  agency.	  
The	  relationship	  has	  been	  built	  around	  two	  poles,	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneur	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  STA	  as	  a	  
principal	   on	   the	   other.	   Between	   these	   poles,	   the	   auditor	   existed	   as	   an	   independent	   party.	   Micro-­‐
entrepreneurs,	  as	  agents,	  have	  had	  access	  to	  all	  his	  or	  her	  accounting	  and	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  their	  
tax	  reports.	  These	  have	  been	  checked	  by	  an	  auditor	  and	  then	  sent	  off	  to	  the	  STA.	  No	  direct	  relationship	  
between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  principal	  has	  been	  found.	  Eight	  of	  ten	  respondents	  have	  not	  had	  any	  contact	  
with	  the	  STA.	  
Six	   respondents	   talked	   in	   terms	   of	   having	   felt	   a	   distance	   to	   the	   STA.	   Those	   entrepreneurs	   have	  
experienced	  the	  authority	  only	  as	  a	  controlling	  function.	  The	  opinions	  have	  been	  that	  the	  STA	  was	  trying	  
to	   frame	  the	  entrepreneurs.	  Respondents	  used	   the	  auditor	  as	  a	   security	  between	   themselves	  and	   the	  
authority.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   independent	   party,	   the	   auditor,	   created	   some	   security	   towards	   the	  
principal.	  The	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  were	  by	  having	  an	  auditor	  secured	  in	  a	  step	  before	  the	  tax	  reports	  
were	  submitted.	  	  
After	   the	   auditor	   secrecy	   was	   abolished	   in	   2010	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   STA	   and	   the	   micro-­‐	  
entrepreneurs	  changed.	  All	  the	  respondents	  found	  the	  abolishment	  as	  a	  positive	  alteration.	  They	  do	  not	  
consider	   the	   independent	   party,	   which	   was	   represented	   by	   the	   auditor,	   as	   necessary.	   Although	   an	  
independent	  party	  can	  boost	   the	  confidence	  of	  a	  business,	  none	  of	   the	   interviewees	   thought	   that	   the	  
relationship	  with	  the	  STA	  would	  have	  deteriorated	  since	  the	  decision	  regarding	  auditor	  secrecy.	  
"I	  think	  the	  change	  has	  been	  good,	  the	  cost	  for	  the	  auditor	  has	  disappeared	  and	  the	  relationship	  to	  the	  
STA	  has	  grown.	   It	   feels	  better	   to	  cooperate	  more	  with	   the	  accounting	  consultant	  and	   then	  have	  direct	  
contact	  with	  the	  STA".	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
The	  image	  of	  the	  tax	  authority	  today	  is	  generally	  better.	  Two	  of	  ten	  respondents	  choose	  to	  contact	  the	  
STA	  when	  they	  have	  issues.	  Most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  who	  still	  have	  this	  archaic	  image	  are	  often	  those	  
who	  still	  have	  not	  tried	  to	  make	  contact.	  The	  STA	  has	  implemented	  an	  organizational	  change,	  regarding	  
customer	  satisfaction,	  which	  has	  contributed	  to	  more	  customer	  focus	  and	  that	  is	  evidently	  shown	  in	  the	  
interview	  group	  (SIQ	  2011).	  	  
"Since	  2010,	  I	  keep	  better	  track	  of	  my	  business's	  accounting,	  I	  have	  learned	  a	  lot	  from	  the	  accountant".	  	  




When	   the	   auditor	   obligations	   were	   removed,	   the	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   got	   a	   closer	   contact	   and	  
relationship	  with	   their	   accounting	   consultant.	   The	   consultant	  was	   given	   a	  bigger	   role	   than	  before	   the	  
auditor	  requirement,	  and	  cooperation	  has	  led	  to	  entrepreneurs	  having	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  their	  
own	  accounting.	  Respondents	  who	  are	  not	  using	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  have	  said	  that	  they	  continued	  
as	  before	  the	  change	  of	  law.	  When	  the	  auditor	  was	  removed,	  the	  independent	  party,	  who	  possessed	  a	  
large	   accounting	   knowledge,	   disappeared.	   The	   reduced	   knowledge	   has	   not	   to	   any	   great	   extent	   been	  
filled	  according	  to	  the	  respondents.	  
Those	  that	  do	  not	  use	  an	  accountant	  consultant	  unconsciously	  utilize	  information	  asymmetry	  that	  exists	  
between	   the	   entrepreneurs	   and	   the	   STA.	   This	   is	   not	   cheating,	   but	   caused	   by	   ignorance	   of	   how	   the	  
accountings	   should	   be	  managed	   in	   order	   to	   file	   a	   correct	   tax	   return.	   Entrepreneurs	   have	   all	   financial	  
information	   available	   but	   have	   still	   given	   incorrect	   information.	   In	   the	   group	   with	   an	   accounting	  
consultant,	   knowledge	   that	  has	   disappeared	  with	   the	  auditor	   today	  has	  been	   recaptured	   through	   the	  
closer	  relationship	  with	  their	  consultant.	  
"I've	   been	   doing	   my	   accountings	   the	   same	   way	   all	   the	   time,	   both	   before	   and	   after	   2010.	   I’ve	   been	  
uncertain	  a	  few	  times	  but	  have	  asked	  a	  colleague	  for	  advice.	  Sometimes	  it	  takes	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  time,	  
but	  mostly	  it	  is	  alright".	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
The	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  who	  use	  a	  consultant	   in	  their	  accounting	  work	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  they	  are	  
trying	  to	  exploit	  the	  information	  asymmetry	  that	  exists,	  not	  before	  the	  change	  in	  auditor	  claim,	  and	  not	  
after.	  They	  have	  a	  better	  overview	  and	  insight	  in	  their	  own	  micro-­‐enterprise	  and	  have	  also	  developed	  a	  
greater	   economic	   knowledge.	   It	   has	   led	   to	   more	   discussions	   about	   how	   to	   manage	   operational	   and	  
accounting	  decisions.	  
Respondents	  without	   any	   collaboration	  with	   an	  accountant	  do	  not	  perceive	   that	   they	  are	   turning	   the	  
asymmetry	  into	  an	  advantage.	  The	  entrepreneurs	  believe	  to	  have	  almost	  the	  same	  extent	  of	  knowledge	  
as	  before	  the	  audit	  abolition,	  and	  therefore	  their	  perception	  is	  in	  line	  with	  their	  experience	  from	  before	  
the	  audit	  annulment.	  Together	  with	  the	  same	  knowledge	  as	  before	  they	  have	  not	  found	  any	  reason	  to	  
search	  for	  loop-­‐holes	  to	  rake	  advantage	  of	  the	  STA.	  
When	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  changed,	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  auditor	  duty,	  a	  result	  was	  that	  
accounting	  knowledge	  disappeared.	  Respondents	  who	  use	  the	  services	  of	  a	  consultant	  have	  adapted	  to	  
the	  new	  relationship	  by	  expanding	  the	  collaboration	  with	  the	  consultant.	  They	  have	  also	  increased	  their	  
accounting	  knowledge	  and	  view	  the	  STA	  as	  an	  authority	  that	  they	  can	  turn	  to	  if	  they	  have	  any	  issue.	  But	  
in	  most	  cases,	  they	  turn	  to	  their	  accountant	  instead.	  
The	   interviewees	   in	   the	  group	  who	  are	  not	  using	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  have,	   in	   the	  new	  situation,	  
lost	  some	  knowledge	  that	  the	  auditor	  possessed.	  The	  result	  has	  been	  that	  a	  knowledge	  gap	  has	  emerged	  
and	  with	  it	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  errors	  in	  the	  tax	  reports.	  It	  is	  also	  this	  group	  who	  still	  hesitate	  to	  contact	  
the	  STA,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  indicates	  that	  they	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  contact	  the	  STA	  after	  
27	  
	  
the	   auditor	   requirement	   was	   removed	   than	   they	   were	   before.	   Three	   respondents	   say	   that	   they	  
sometimes	  ask	  colleagues	  or	  acquaintances	  if	  they	  have	  trouble.	  In	  the	  same	  breath	  they	  add	  that	  this	  
course	   of	   action	   in	   the	   future	   may	   lead	   to	   hiring	   a	   consultant.	   In	   the	   group	   without	   an	   accounting	  
consultant,	  two	  respondents	  tell	  us	  that	  a	  few	  times	  may	  have	  taken	  a	  chance	  instead	  of	  finding	  out	  the	  
correct	  answer.	  	  
4.4 Views on legitimacy 
When	  the	  interviews	  were	  guided	  towards	  issues	  regarding	  legitimacy,	  the	  respondents	  gave	  their	  views	  
of	  the	  tax	  agency	  as	  authoritarian.	  The	  topic	  has	  been	  discussed	  both	  in	  the	  group	  which	  today	  employs	  
an	  accounting	  consultant,	  and	  those	  respondents	  who	  choose	  to	  manage	  their	  accounts	  themselves.	  
What	   emerged	   in	   the	   discussion	   was	   that	   the	   view	   of	   the	   STA's	   legitimacy	   has	   changed	   in	   the	   last	  
decade,	  according	  to	  nine	  of	  ten	  respondents.	  The	  STA	  used	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  threat	  -­‐	  an	  authority	  
that	  was	  looking	  to	  penalize.	  Today	  however,	  the	  respondents	  have	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  STA	  seeks	  more	  to	  
stop	   tax	  evasion	   than	   to	   frame	  entrepreneurs	  who	  are	  mistaken	   in	  any	  clause	  of	   the	   tax	  preparation.	  
Several	  respondents	  also	  say	  that	  they	  especially	  do	  not	  think	  there	  is	  any	  reason	  for	  the	  STA	  to	  point	  
out	   a	   small	   error	   that	   occurred	   by	   accident,	   as	   it	   is	   often	   these	   sums	   are	   as	   small	   as	   1000	   Swedish	  
crowns.	  	  
"It	  probably	  costs	  more	  than	  it's	  worth	  to	  fix	  the	  occasional	  receipts	  missing,	  or	  point	  out	  an	  error	  in	  the	  
representation.	  I	  cannot	  see	  any	  purpose	  other	  than	  to	  show	  that	  control	  may	  occur	  to	  ensure	  that	  small	  
business	  owners	  persist	  to	  handle	  their	  accounting	  according	  to	  the	  rules".	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
The	  answers	  that	  we	  got	  from	  the	  other	  respondents	  also	  state	  that	  this	  is	  the	  general	  perception	  of	  the	  
tax	   audit	   in	   small	   businesses	   today.	   That	   vision	   has	   changed	   during	   the	   last	   decade	   according	   to	   a	  
majority	  of	  our	  respondents.	  Two	  respondents	  though,	  said	  that	  their	  view	  of	  the	  STA	  had	  not	  changed	  
at	  all,	  or	  that	  it	  was	  not	  something	  they	  had	  thought	  about.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  you	  can	  find	  a	  certain	  hesitancy	  concerning	  confidence	  towards	  the	  STA	  today	  is	  evidenced	  
by	   the	   fact	   that	  eight	  of	   ten	   respondents	   rather	  avoid	   to	  call	   the	  STA	   for	  help.	  They	  prefer	   to	   turn	   to	  
their	   accountant	   if	   they	   have	   one,	   or	   acquaintances,	   for	   answers.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   they	   have	   a	  
closer	  relation	  to	  them	  and	  also	  since	  they	  subconsciously	  fear	  that	  calling	  to	  the	  STA	  will	  result	  in	  a	  tax	  
review.	  Even	   though	  all	   respondents	  also	   say	   that	   they	  know	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case,	   they	   still	   argue	   this	  
way.	  Here	  is	  an	  example:	  	  
"Obviously,	  I	  know	  that	  there	  are	  no	  records	  of	  those	  who	  call	  in	  with	  questions.	  And	  even	  if	  there	  were	  
records	  like	  that,	  it	  would	  rather	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  honesty	  to	  call	  in	  for	  help.	  It	  would	  show	  that	  you	  wish	  to	  do	  
right.	  Perhaps	  the	  reason	  you	  prefer	  to	  not	  call	  in	  for	  help	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  think	  the	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tax	  agency	  believes	  they	  will	  find	  more	  mistakes	  in	  your	  accounting	  if	  you	  have	  called	  in	  with	  a	  question	  
and	  shown	  that	  you	  are	  not	  too	  sure	  about	  how	  you	  handle	  your	  books.”	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
The	  respondents	  were	  discussing	  legitimacy	  towards	  the	  STA	  as	  well	  as	  other	  stakeholders	  and	  received	  
follow-­‐up	  questions.	  The	  respondents	  were	  asked	  how	  they	  believe	  abolition	  of	  a	  mandatory	  auditor	  for	  
small	   micro-­‐enterprises	   may	   have	   affected	   the	   trust	   between	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   stakeholders	  
such	  as	  banks	  and	   investors.	  Both	  groups	   reasoned	  here	   that	   regarding	  a	  bank	  or	   investor	  one	  would	  
have	  greater	  confidence	  in	  a	  small	  business	  if	  you	  made	  use	  of	  an	  independent	  auditor.	  Therefore	  they	  
believe	  it	  is	  good	  that	  the	  possibility	  still	  exists	  today.	  However,	  four	  respondents	  said	  they	  believed	  the	  
legitimacy	  could	  decrease	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  use	  an	  accountant,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  
not	  mandatory	  today.	  	  
Our	   empirical	   findings	   also	   show	   that	   the	   confidence	   towards	   the	   regular	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   has	  
changed.	  One	  reason	  is	  that,	  even	  if	  one	  would	  not	  deliberately	  manipulate	  the	  books	  themselves,	  one	  
would	   think	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   independent	   part	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   auditor	   has	   disappeared	   has	  
opened	  up	  the	  opportunity	  for	  others	  to	  shirk	  with	  their	  books.	  
Nine	  of	  the	  ten	  respondents	  note	  that	  their	   legitimacy	  towards	  the	  STA	  has	  not	  changed.	  No	  matter	   if	  
one's	  confidence	  before	  the	  abolishment	  has	  been	  strongly	  or	   less	  strong	  regarding	  the	  STA,	   the	  view	  
has	  not	  changed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mandatory	  auditor	  is	  removed.	  
"I	   am	   the	   one	   who	   is	   being	   scrutinized;	   I	   am	   not	   the	   one	   who	   examines.	   If	   the	   legitimacy	   has	   been	  
reduced,	  it	  is	  against	  me,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  control	  of	  me	  as	  a	  small	  business	  owner	  that	  is	  now	  faltering."	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
In	   short,	   legitimacy	   towards	   the	  STA	  has	  not	  been	  affected	   in	  either	   group	  of	  our	   respondents.	   If	   the	  
confidence	  in	  the	  STA	  was	  high	  before	  year	  2010,	  it	  is	  just	  as	  high	  today,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  However,	  two	  
respondents	  from	  each	  group	  believed	  that	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  as	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  has	  declined.	  
Mainly	   their	   belief	   is	   that	   their	   status	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   stakeholders	   such	   as	   banks	   and	   investors	   has	  
changed,	   but	   also	   from	   the	   STA.	   Therefore,	   our	   empirical	   findings	   show	   that	   it	   could	   be	   better	   to	  
continue	  using	  an	  independent	  auditor.	  	  
The	  respondents’	  view	  upon	  the	  STA	  as	  a	  controlling	  authority	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  However,	  
this	  seems	  not	  to	  be	   linked	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mandatory	  auditing	  duty	  regarding	  this	  group	  of	  small	  
businesses	  was	  abolished.	  It	  is	  simply	  so	  that	  the	  STA's	  reputation	  has	  gone	  from	  a	  belief	  that	  they	  are	  
looking	  to	  frame	  small	  business	  owners,	  to	  now	  wanting	  to	  get	  the	  accounting	  as	  straight	  as	  possible.	  	  
The	  answers	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  views	  above	  are	  few.	  These	  respondents	  say	  that	  their	  view	  of	  the	  STA	  
has	   not	   changed	   or	   that	   they	   have	   not	   given	   thought	   to	   the	  matter.	   No	   respondents	   claim	   that	   the	  
legitimacy	   towards	   the	   STA	   from	   their	   point	   of	   view	   has	   decreased	   over	   the	   last	   decade,	   or	   more	  
specifically	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mandatory	  auditing	  duty	  was	  abolished.	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4.5 Perspectives on tax compliance and tax evasion 
On	  the	  theme	  of	  tax	  evasion,	  respondents	  answered	  questions	  about	  how	  they	  have	  acted	  legally	  about	  
their	  tax	  reporting.	  None	  in	  either	  group	  responded	  affirmatively	  when	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  cheated,	  but	  
there	  was	  still	  a	   lot	  of	  discussion	  around	  the	   topic.	  Thoughts	   that	  were	  present	  with	   the	   interviewees	  
were	   often	   related	   to	   items	   in	   the	   accounts	   that	   they	   felt	   unsafe	   around.	   Seven	   of	   ten	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	   responded	   that	   they	   feel	   that	   the	   hardest	   part	   is	   dealing	   with	   VAT	   correctly.	  
	  	  
No	  one	   in	   this	   study	  has	  been	   caught	   for	   tax	   evasion,	   but	   two	  have	   received	   complaints.	   There	  were	  
smaller	   misdemeanors	   and	   something	   they	   could	   correct	   and	   then	   send	   to	   the	   STA	   again.	   The	  
respondents	  who	  have	  had	  a	  reprimand	  have	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  tax	  authorities	  over	  the	  phone.	  The	  
perception	  was	   that	   they	  were	   treated	  well	   and	  were	   able	   to	   get	   help	   to	   fix	   what	  was	  wrong.	   After	  
receiving	  a	  complaint	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  says	  that	  they	  became	  more	  cautious	  in	  their	  reporting.	  
Not	   anyone	   experienced	   it	   as	   unpleasant	   to	   get	   a	   note	   and	   it	  was	   largely	   the	   result	   of	   a	   correct	   and	  
friendly	  conversation	  with	  the	  STA.	  
"I	  have	  not	  contacted	  the	  Tax	  Board	  with	  questions;	  I	  feel	  an	  anxiety	  about	  being	  scrutinized	  if	  I	  do,	  even	  
though	  I	  know	  that	  it	  is	  not	  going	  to	  happen.	  But	  somewhere	  it	  still	  takes	  mind	  to	  call".	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
When	  the	  aspect	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  rationally	  there	  is	  a	  small	  chance	  of	  being	  caught	  in	  case	  you	  try	  to	  
execute	   tax	  evasion	  was	  discussed,	   the	   respondents	   responded	   that	   they	  did	  not	  want	   to	  manipulate	  
their	  accounts.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  deliberately	  cheating	  was	  unsatisfactory.	  The	  knowledge	  of	  
cheating	  with	  the	  risk	  of	  audit	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  their	  decisions.	  A	  large	  part	  of	  the	  business	  owners,	  
six	  of	   ten,	   told	  us	   that	   the	   fear	  of	  being	  audited	   is	  often	   in	   their	  minds.	  The	   risk	  of	  an	  audit	   is	  always	  
present.	  Five	  of	  ten	  of	  respondents	  said	  that	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  contact	  the	  STA	  which	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  
fear	  of	  being	  scrutinized.	  While	  highlighting	  that	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  no	  extra	  examination	  will	  be	  done,	  
they	  still	  all	  choose	  not	  to	  take	  the	  risk.	  
Those	   two	   respondents	   who	   have	   been	   in	   contact	   with	   tax	   authorities,	   say	   they	   have	   got	   a	   better	  
picture	  of	  the	  STA	  than	  they	  previously	  had.	  They	  say	  that	  their	  willingness	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  STA	  has	  grown.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   fear	   of	   examination	   exists.	   Surprisingly	   few	   know	   about	   the	   penalty	   for	   tax	  
evasion.	  Everyone	  knows	  that	  the	  punishment	  is	  a	  fine	  but	  eight	  of	  the	  respondents	  do	  not	  know	  what	  
the	  size	  of	  the	  fine	  is.	  During	  the	  interviews	  we	  got	  the	  feeling	  that	  it	  is	  the	  punishment	  in	  itself	  that	  the	  
respondents	  are	  trying	  to	  avoid,	  the	  amount	  is	  not	  what	  matters.	  
When	  we	  discussed	  what	  the	  STA	  could	  do	  differently	  to	  reduce	  the	  distance	  to	  the	  entrepreneur,	  and	  
open	  up	  a	  dialogue,	  two	  of	  the	  respondents	  suggested	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  have	  a	  personal	  contact.	  
They	  felt	  that	  it	  would	  open	  up	  for	  conversation	  and	  partially	  remove	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  extra-­‐checked	  
because	  of	  the	  contact.	  Other	  suggestions	  that	  came	  up	  were	  that	  the	  tax	  reporting	  would	  be	  facilitated.	  
Everyone	   think	   that	   one	   or	   several	   parts	   of	   the	   form	   is	   difficult	   to	   fill.	   There	   was	   not	   proposed	   any	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concrete	  suggestions	  about	  how	  that	  would	  happen,	  but	  many	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  challenge	  is	  VAT,	  to	  
keep	  updated	  on	  new	  rules	  and	  all	  the	  dates	  that	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  need	  to	  keep	  track	  of.	  
Two	  of	  ten	  respondents	  say	  that	  they	  sometimes	  make	  mistakes	  with	  small	  sums,	  for	  example,	  a	  receipt	  
is	   sometimes	   handled	   wrongly.	   When	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   is	   never	   more	   than	   100-­‐200	   SEK.	   In	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   that	   discussion	   they	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   feel	   especially	   vulnerable	   as	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs.	   They	   argue	   that	   larger	   firms	   are	   able	   to,	   for	   example,	   do	   group	   contributions	   and	   tax	  
planning	   in	   a	   different	  way.	   It	   is	   again	   seen	   in	   three	   of	   five	   respondents	   from	   the	   group	  who	  do	   not	  
make	  use	  of	  an	  accountant.	  
”Sometimes	  it	  feels	  hopeless,	  at	  least	  half	  of	  what	  I	  earn	  is	  lost	  in	  tax,	  I	  can’t	  do	  anything	  to	  go	  around	  
that	  fact,	  as	  a	  small	  business	  owner	  I	  don't	  have	  an	  option	  like	  larger	  businesses	  that	  can	  execute	  group	  
contribution.”	  
(Entrepreneur	  of	  the	  group	  that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant.)	  
	  
During	  the	  interviews	  we	  felt	  that	  there	  is	  a	  duality	  around	  making	  contact	  with	  a	  tax	  office.	  Those	  who	  
have	  had	  contact	  reflect	  that	  it	  has	  been	  positive,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  being	  audited.	  The	  interviewees	  
who	  have	  had	  the	  most	  number	  of	  contacts	  are	  the	  most	  satisfied.	  The	  respondent	  says	  that	  the	  STA	  has	  
really	  taken	  the	  time	  and	  put	  themselves	  into	  his	  or	  hers	  problems.	  The	  perception	  is	  that	  you	  really	  get	  
help.	   It	   tends	   to	   be	   that	   those	  who	   have	   trouble	   getting	   the	   enterprise	   to	  work	   are	   those	  who	   have	  
received	  the	  very	  best	  treatment.	  The	  respondents	  have	  felt	  so	  vulnerable	  when	  their	  business	  has	  been	  
in	  crisis	  that	  they	  not	  have	  seen	  any	  obstacle	  to	  call	  and	  get	  help.	  We	  do	  not	  hope	  that	  entrepreneurs	  
will	   have	   to	   be	   in	   crisis	   to	   achieve	   the	   best	   contact	   and	   the	   image	   of	   the	   authority,	   but	   there	   is	   a	  
tendency	  in	  that	  direction.	  
The	   respondents	   in	   the	   group	   without	   an	   accountant	   ask	   a	   colleague	   or	   friend	   when	   they	   have	   a	  
problem.	  One	  of	  the	  participants,	  however,	  says	  that	  after	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  audit,	  he	  has	  a	  few	  times	  
gambled	   in	   the	   report.	   The	   perception	   is	   that	   they	   can	   manage	   without	   an	   auditor.	   They	   did	   not	  
consider	   that	   the	   auditor	   contributed	   with	   any	   knowledge.	   However,	   they	   had	   discussions	   with	   the	  
auditor	  between	  2-­‐5	  times	  a	  year,	  and	  they	  always	  asked	  about	  items	  in	  the	  accounts	  they	  were	  unsure	  
about.	  Without	  the	  auditor	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  risk	  that	  compliance	  deteriorates,	  eight	  of	  ten	  still	  claim	  that	  
they	   have	   enough	   accounting	   knowledge.	   However,	   from	   the	   interviews	  we	   see	   that,	   because	   of	   the	  
removal	   of	   the	   auditor	   duty,	   the	   risk	   of	   inadvertent	   errors	   has	   increased.	   The	   errors	   have	   been	  
completely	  oblivious	  or	  relied	  on	  what	  you	  think	  is	  correct.	  





We	   have	   divided	   the	   analysis	   according	   to	   the	   study’s	   four	   main	   themes.	   First	   we	   analyze	   how	   the	  
cooperation	   between	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   accounting	   consultants	   has	   changed	   since	   there	   no	  
longer	  is	  mandatory	  to	  use	  an	  auditor.	  We	  then	  continue	  to	  discuss	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs'	  thoughts	  
on	  how	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  STA	  have	  changed	  since	  the	  audit	  requirement	  was	  removed.	  In	  which	  
way	  they	  find	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  independent	  party	  no	  longer	  exists	  and	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  that	  are.	  The	  
following	   section	   deals	   with	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   how	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   and	   the	   STA's	   ditto	   has	  
changed	  after	  2010.	  Finally	  we	  discuss	  how	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  look	  at	  tax	  compliance,	  and	  if	  there	  
is	  any	  difference	  before	  and	  after	  the	  abolition	  of	  audit	  duty.	  	  
5.2 The role of accounting and external accountants 
Marriott	  and	  Marriott	  (2000)	  write	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  small	  business	  and	  their	  accountant	  
tends	   to	   be	   long	   term.	   This	   is	   regardless	   of	   whether	   you	   feel	   fully	   satisfied	   with	   the	   work	   that	   the	  
consultant	   does.	   Our	   empirical	   evidence	   shows	   that	   two	   of	   the	   respondents	   who	   use	   an	   accountant	  
have	  ever	  changed	  this.	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  changes	  were	  due	  to	  an	  external	  change,	  for	  example	  while	  
switching	   from	   using	   an	   auditor	   to	   an	   accountant.	   The	   auditor	   had	   previously	   been	   used	   as	   a	  
bookkeeper	  as	  well	  as	  for	  auditing,	  and	  at	  the	  change	  the	  auditor	  referred	  to	  an	  accountant	  instead.	  In	  
none	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  change	  was	  due	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  work	  that	  the	  accountant	  had	  done.	  	  
Gooderham	  et	  al	  (2004)	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  length	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  small	  business	  owner	  
and	  its	  bookkeeper	  does	  not	  determine	  how	  the	  accountant’s	  quality	  of	  work	  is	  perceived.	  Instead	  it	  is	  
the	  confidence	  that	  the	  small	  business	  owner	  feels	  for	  his	  accountant	  that	  determines	  this.	  According	  to	  
our	   empirical	   information	   this	   trust	   depends	   on	   whether	   the	   micro-­‐enterprise	   has	   received	   any	  
complaints	   from	   the	   STA	   on	   their	   filed	   tax	   return.	   If	   you	   have	   not	   received	   any	   complaint,	   the	  
respondents	   do	   not	   think	   that	   there	   is	   anything	   to	   complain	   about.	   Generally	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   factors	  
other	  than	  the	  work	  that	  the	  accountant	  provides	  that	  determines	  how	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  view	  
their	   accountants.	   Factors	   such	   as	   availability	   and	   agreeable	   treatment	   are	   important	   for	   the	  
respondents.	  	  
Small	   business	   owners	   may	   also	   lack	   sufficient	   financial	   knowledge	   to	   assess	   their	   accounting	  
consultant’s	  work	  (Gooderham	  et	  al	  2004).	  This	  is	  indicated	  by	  our	  study.	  Two	  of	  the	  respondents	  using	  
an	  accountant	  say	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  enough	  about	  what	  their	  consultants	  are	  doing,	  or	  that	  they	  
lack	  the	  skills,	  to	  assess	  their	  work.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  feel	  capable	  of	  assessing	  your	  accounting	  consultant's	  
work	   based	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   his	   work,	   it	   is	   natural	   to	   judge	   from	   other	   factors.	   Factors	   that	   are	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comprehensible,	   such	   as	   availability	   and	   agreeable	   treatment.	   Our	   study	   showed	   that	   these	   were	  
important.	  	  
Small	   business	  owners	  use	   their	   accountants	   for	   advice	   to	  different	  degrees	   (Gooderham	  et	   al	   2004).	  
Our	   study	   shows	   that	   the	   reason	  why	  one	  uses	   their	   consultant	   for	  advice	   is	   that	   this	   can	  cover	  up	  a	  
knowledge	   gap	   that	   exists	   between	   the	  micro-­‐entrepreneur	   and	   the	   consultant.	   However,	   six	   of	   ten	  
respondents	  believe	  that	  the	  extra	  knowledge	  that	  the	  consultant	  can	  provide	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  their	  
micro-­‐enterprises.	   They	   believe	   that	   the	   cost,	   compared	   to	   the	   external	   knowledge	   received,	   is	   too	  
great.	   Research	   has	   shown,	   however,	   that	   buying	   external	   knowledge	   has	   led	   to	   increased	   sales	   and	  
survival	  of	   family	  businesses	  (Barbera	  and	  Hasso	  2013).	  Marriott	  and	  Marriott	   (2000)	  argue	  that	  many	  
small	   businesses	  would	   benefit	   from	  bringing	   in	   external	   expertise,	   and	   say	   "The	  Underlying	   problem	  
stems	  from	  Weaknesses	  in	  the	  financial	  awareness	  of	  the	  owner	  managers".	  	  
Our	   study	   shows	   that	   the	   group	   employing	   an	   accountant	   also	   utilizes	   their	   accounts	  more	   than	   the	  
group	  without	  an	  accounting	  consultant.	  Four	  respondents	  in	  the	  first	  group	  versus	  only	  one	  in	  the	  other	  
group.	  Our	   study	   thus	   shows	   that	   respondents	   in	   the	  group	  without	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  believe	  
that	   the	   cost	   exceeds	   the	  benefits	   of	   buying	   this	   knowledge,	   and	   the	  majority	  of	   this	   group	  does	  not	  
utilize	   its	   accounting	   for	   tax	   planning	   or	   business	   decision.	   Since	   the	  micro-­‐enterprises	   are	   similar	   to	  
small	   business	   regarding	   business	   structure	   and	   governance	   terms,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   research	   by	  
Barbara	   and	   Hasso	   (2013)	   also	   applies	   to	   the	   group	   of	   micro-­‐enterprises.	   The	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  
would	   then	  benefit	   from	  purchasing	  external	   knowledge	   in	   terms	  of	   sales	  and	   survival.	   This	  however,	  
requires	  an	   intention	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  expansion	   (Gooderham	  et	  al	  2004)	  and	  a	  good	  strategic	  process	  
within	  the	  company	  (Barbera	  and	  Hasso	  2013).	  	  
Due	  to	   lack	  of	  knowledge,	  small	  business	  owners	  do	  not	  utilize	  their	  systems	  to	  full	  capacity	   (Marriott	  
and	  Marriott	  2000).	  Accounting	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  area	  that	  does	  not	  get	  enough	  attention	  from	  
small	   business	   owners	   according	   to	   Salvato	   and	   Moore	   (2010).	   This	   research	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   be	  
applicable	  to	  micro-­‐enterprises.	  We	  can	  see	  this	   in	  our	  study	  as	  the	  respondents	  themselves	  said	  they	  
did	   not	   use	   their	   accounts	   to	   their	   full	   capacity.	   There	   are	   constant	   updates	   of	   laws	   and	   regulations.	  
Eight	   of	   ten	   respondents	   said	   that	   they	   thought	   there	   were	   rules	   as	   they	   themselves,	   as	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs,	  should	  keep	  track	  of.	  But	  they	  also	  thought	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  stay	  updated	  on	  the	  changes	  
being	  made.	  One	  half	  has	  compensated	  for	  this	  by	  using	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  whose	  job	  is	  to	  keep	  
abreast	  of	  these	  changes	  and	  updates,	  and	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  rules	  that	  are	  favorable	  for	  their	  clients.	  	  
5.3 The relation between micro-entrepreneurs and the Swedish Tax 
Agency 
The	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   argue	   that	   information	   asymmetry	   before	   the	   audit	   abolition	   was	   not	  
something	  they	  took	  advantages	  of.	  Nor	  now	  or	  after	  the	  change,	  when	  there	  is	  greater	  scope	  for	  moral	  
hazard	  (Miller	  2005).	  The	  respondents	  consider	  that	  they	  are	  not	  exposing	  STA	  to	  negative	  information	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asymmetry.	   In	   the	   group	   which	   uses	   an	   accounting	   consultant	   the	   free	   audit	   has	   not	   indicated	   any	  
tendencies	   regarding	  utilization	  of	   the	   information	  asymmetry.	   Information	  asymmetry	   is	   larger	   today	  
than	  it	  was	  before	  2010.	  However,	  it	  has	  not	  led	  to	  an	  increased	  immorality	  in	  the	  group.	  
In	  the	  group	  of	  respondents	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  consultant,	  there	  is	  no	  intention	  to	  exploit	  asymmetry.	  
They	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   change	   has	   led	   to	   changed	   behavior	   regarding	   moral	   hazard.	   The	  
experience	  is	  not	  that	  today's	  new	  situation	  brings	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  trying	  to	  withhold	  information	  
from	   the	   principal,	   the	   STA.	   In	   the	   study,	   one	   can	   see	   that	   this	   group	   has	   dropped	   in	   accounting	  
knowledge,	  when	  the	  auditor	  was	  removed.	  It	  could	  mean	  that	  the	  potential	  asymmetry	  has	  decreased	  
as	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  would	  no	   longer	  have	   as	   good	   skills.	  With	   the	   audit	   abolition,	   the	   accounting	  
knowledge	  was	  reduced	  in	  the	  group	  without	  an	  accounting	  consultant,	  which	  probably	  reduces	  rather	  
than	  increases	  the	  potential	  for	  moral	  hazard.	  
The	  problem	  regarding	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  more	  information	  and	  can	  affect	  the	  principal's	  ability	  
to	  take	  care	  of	  its	  interests	  is	  shown	  to	  have	  decreased	  (Braun	  and	  Guston	  2003).	  In	  the	  group	  not	  using	  
an	  accountant	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  the	  reduced	  knowledge	  from	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  auditor	  has	  not	  been	  
covered	  by	  new	  knowledge	  added.	  Nevertheless	  interviewees	  tell	  us	  that	  they	  have	  enough	  knowledge.	  
However	   our	   empirical	   study	   indicates	   that	   this	   group	   has	   not	   had	   an	   increase	   in	   information	  
asymmetry.	   E.g.	   one	   of	   the	   interviewees,	   in	   the	   group	   without	   an	   accountant,	   admits	   that	   he	   has	  
gambled	  in	  his	  tax	  reporting	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  knowledge.	  
When	  we	  discussed	  the	  audit	  requirement	  abolition,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	   it	   is	  no	  longer	  a	  requirement	  to	  
have	  an	  auditor,	  both	   interview	  groups	  agreed	  with	  each	  other.	  None	  of	   the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   felt	  
that	  what	   the	   auditor	  had	  possessed	   in	   knowledge	  was	  missing	   after	   the	   amendment	   about	  using	   an	  
auditor.	   Kren	   and	   Kerr	   (1993)	   argue	   that	   an	   independent	   party	   reduces	   the	   risk	   for	   agents	   to	   shirk.	  
Despite	   this,	   both	   groups	   were	   consistent	   in	   their	   statement	   concerning	   the	   auditor.	   Respondents	  
thought	  of	   it	  as	  an	  expense	  and	  did	  not	  see	  any	  connection	  between	  having	  an	  auditor	  and	   increased	  
credit.	   The	   role	   as	   an	   independent	   party	   and	   mark	   of	   accounting	   quality	   is	   not	   something	   that	  
entrepreneurs	   experienced	   as	   positive	   enough	   to	  want	   to	   keep	   their	   auditor.	   The	   consensus	   of	   both	  
groups	  is	  that	  the	  abolished	  requirement	  was	  a	  positive	  change.	  Pauly	  (1974)	  argues	  about	  the	  reason	  
for	  not	  expecting	  a	  worse	  outcome	  just	  from	  removing	  an	  independent	  party.	  Both	  groups	  that	  we	  have	  
interviewed	  have	  had	  the	  same	  reason.	  	  
If	  the	  agent	  is	  acting	  correctly	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  require	  a	  review,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  principal	  
has	   no	   knowledge	   if	   the	   work	   performed	   is	   optimal	   if	   there	   is	   no	   audit	   (Kren	   and	   Kerr	   1993).	   The	  
entrepreneurs	  were	  before	   the	   audit	   abolition	   forced	   to	  have	   an	   independent	   party	   to	   provide	  proof	  
that	  the	  tax	  reporting	  was	  accurate.	  All	  respondents	  highlight	  that	  they	  did	  not	  found	  that	  the	  auditor	  
added	  anything	  regarding	  accounting	  knowledge	  to	  their	  bookkeeping.	  Empirical	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  
auditor's	  role	  plays	  a	  minor	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  an	  optimal	  relationship	  between	  the	  
micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  and	  the	  STA.	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5.4 Views on legitimacy 
Tyler	   (2006)	   argues	   that	   justice	   is	   something	   that	   can	  be	  used	  both	   to	   create	   legitimacy	  as	  well	   as	   to	  
maintain	   it.	  This	  view	  differs	  from	  earlier	  research	  which	  states	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  award	  penalties	  and	  
rewards	   determines	   the	   degree	   of	   an	   organization's	   influence.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   our	   empirical	  
findings	  regarding	  the	  legitimacy	  towards	  the	  STA.	  Our	  respondents	  felt	  that	  the	  image	  of	  the	  STA	  and	  
their	   trust	   towards	   them	   had	   improved	   in	   the	   last	   ten	   years.	   However,	   this	   was	   not	   due	   to	   the	  
abolishment	  of	  the	  mandatory	  audit	  requirement.	  Instead,	  they	  expressed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  image	  about	  
the	  STA’s	  work	  that	  had	  changed.	  Previously,	  the	  view	  of	  the	  STA	  had	  been	  experienced	  as	  a	  controlling	  
authority	  looking	  to	  punish	  businesses.	  Today,	  the	  view	  has	  changed	  to	  an	  agency	  looking	  to	  prevent	  tax	  
fraud	  and	  insert	  justice	  rather	  than	  pointing	  out	  minor	  errors	  that	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  significant	  impact	  
financially	   for	   either	   the	   micro-­‐enterprises	   or	   the	   tax	   authority.	   Our	   empirical	   evidence	   is	   therefore	  
consistent	  with	  our	  theoretical	  framework.	  
However,	  a	  certain	  fear	  of	  the	  STA	  still	  exists	  today,	  according	  to	  our	  empirical	  findings,	  which	  show	  that	  
micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  are	  unwilling	  to	  call	  the	  STA	  to	  ask	  a	  question	  regarding	  their	  tax	  reporting.	  They	  
fear	  being	  punished	  or	  reviewed,	  if	  they	  appear	  ignorant	  of	  existing	  laws.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  respondents	  
claim	  to	  know	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  which	  indicates	  a	  confidence	  in	  the	  authority.	  This	  trust	  is	  essential	  for	  
authoritarians	  as	   it	   increases	  the	  ability	  to	   implement	  the	  decisions	  being	  made	  as	  well	  as	  compliance	  
(Tyler	  2006).	  
Two	   ways	   to	   achieve	   a	   higher	   legitimacy	   is	   to	   work	   actively	   with	   environmental	   issues	   and	   giving	  
volunteer	   information	   (Bansal	   and	   Clelland	   2004).	   Earlier,	   before	   the	   auditing	   requirement	   was	  
abolished,	   it	   was	  mandatory	   for	   all	   incorporated	   businesses	   to	   submit	   their	   reports	   for	   review	   by	   an	  
auditor	  each	  year.	  Today,	  you	  can	  do	  so	  by	  choice,	  but	  it	   is	  not	  a	  requirement.	  Those	  small	  businesses	  
which	   today	   choose	   to	   continue	   to	   use	   an	   auditor	   thus	   have	   an	   extra	   safety.	   They	   volunteer	   to	   be	  
audited.	  Voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  information	  may	  increase	  stakeholder	  confidence	  in	  the	  enterprise	  that	  
chooses	   to	  be	  more	  open	  with	   their	   financial	   statement,	   or	   at	   least	   appears	   to	  be	  more	   transparent.	  
Similarly,	  our	  empirical	  evidence	  shows	  that	  small	  business	  owners	  today	  may	  choose	  to	  voluntarily	  be	  
audited,	  and	  thus	  increase	  its	  legitimacy	  among	  its	  stakeholders	  such	  as	  banks	  and	  investors.	  	  
Regarding	   accounting	   and	   auditing,	   the	   STA	   as	   a	   controlling	   authority	   seeks	   to	   achieve	   practical	  
legitimacy.	  This	  is	  by	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  correct	  tax	  reports.	  It	  is	  executed	  by	  possessing	  
a	  high	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  This	  is	  supported	  theoretically	  by	  research	  showing	  that	  a	  higher	  legitimacy	  
increases	  the	  chance	  for	  an	  authority’s	  regulatory	  to	  be	  complied	  (Tyler	  2006).	  
During	   the	   interviews,	  our	   respondents	  argued	  according	   to	  moral	   legitimacy.	  These	  discussions	  arose	  
mainly	   on	   issues	   related	   to	   tax	   compliance.	   The	   empirical	   basis	   of	   our	   study	   shows	   that	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	   are	   trying	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing.	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   are	   trying	   to	   submit	   correct	   tax	  
reports.	  The	  reason	  for	  wanting	  to	  do	  so	  is	  that	  the	  respondents	  believe	  this	  to	  be	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  
Therefore,	   they	  tend	  to	  reason	  towards	  moral	   legitimacy.	  During	  the	  discussions	  the	  respondents	  also	  
showed	  a	  concern	  regarding	  the	  legitimacy	  towards	  themselves	  as	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs.	  They	  believed	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that	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  group	  had	  decreased	  after	  the	  audit	  requirement	  was	  abolished.	  This	  was	  
clear	  by	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  business	  environment	  would	  believe	  that	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs,	  as	  a	  group	  in	  
general,	  would	  tax	  cheat	  to	  a	  greater	  extent,	  now	  with	  the	  mandatory	  auditing	  requirement	  having	  been	  
abolished.	  There	  was	   in	  other	  words	  a	   concern	   from	  our	   respondents	   that	  other	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  
would	  not	  seek	  moral	  legitimacy,	  but	  consciously	  would	  shirk	  their	  accounts	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  our	  empirical	  evidence	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  
this	   study.	   The	   change	   in	   the	   view	   of	   the	   STA	   as	   the	   controlling	   authority	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	  
research	   showing	   that	   justice	   gives	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   legitimacy,	   rather	   than	   punishment.	   Also	   our	  
respondents'	   arguments	   that	   the	   voluntary	   use	   of	   an	   auditor	   may	   give	   an	   added	   legitimacy	   from	  
stakeholders	  such	  as	  banks	  and	  investors	  are	  supported	  by	  research	  on	  volunteer	  information.	  
5.5 Perspectives on tax compliance and tax evasion 
Alm	   et	   al	   (1992)	   argue	   that	   in	   a	   purely	   economic	   analysis	   regarding	   tax	   evasion,	   the	   rational	   action	  
should	  be	  cheating.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  low	  risk	  of	  detection.	  Due	  to	  this	  fact	  most	  countries	  have	  a	  
low	  deterrence	  rate.	  Respondents	  in	  the	  group	  with	  an	  accountant	  consultant	  say	  that	  they	  do	  not	  want	  
to	  cheat	  and	  that	  they	  have	  never	  knowingly	  cheated.	  The	  reason	  they	  have	  not	  taken	  the	  risk	   is	   that	  
there	   is	  a	   fear	  of	  being	  discovered.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	   is	  small	   risk	  of	  being	  discovered	  does	  not	  have	  
great	  significance	  in	  this	  group.	  The	  respondents	  say	  it	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  an	  unpleasant	  feeling	  and	  that	  it	  
feels	  morally	  wrong	  to	  cheat.	  This	  is	  their	  reason	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  law.	  	  
In	  the	  group	  who	  do	  not	  have	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  they	  answered	  similarly,	  but	  one	  of	  the	  micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	  says	  he	  on	  occasion	  gambles	  in	  tax	  reporting.	  The	  reason	  for	  his	  action	  is	  based	  on	  lack	  of	  
knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  submit	  a	  proper	  report	  and	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  an	  attempt	  to	  cheat.	  Two	  of	  the	  
respondents	  in	  this	  group	  have	  received	  complaints	  from	  the	  STA.	  They	  have	  taken	  action	  to	  correct	  the	  
problem	  and	  have	  not	  been	  punished	  by	  a	  fine.	  Entrepreneurs	  in	  both	  groups	  state	  that	  they	  are	  most	  
afraid	  of	  being	  detected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  moral	  considerations.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  fine	  itself	  that	  is	  feared.	  
If	   the	  STA	  treats	  taxpayers	   in	  a	   fair	  and	  friendly	  manner	  there	   is	  an	   increase	   in	  compliance.	  Taxpayers	  
show	  high	  tax	  morale	  if	  they	  are	  well	  treated	  by	  the	  tax	  authorities.	  If	  they	  are	  treated	  in	  an	  unpleasant	  
way	  taxpayers	  try	  actively	  to	  avoid	  paying	  taxes	  (Frey	  and	  Feld	  2002).	  Those	  respondents	  who	  have	  been	  
in	  contact	  with	  the	  STA	  say	  that	  they	  were	  well	  treated.	  Two	  of	  the	  respondents	  have	  been	  in	  contact	  
with	  the	  STA	  and	  the	  others	  have	  not	  contacted	  the	  tax	  authorities.	  There	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  
groups.	  	  
Those	  who	  have	  not	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  STA	  say	  that	  they	  are	  afraid	  of	  being	  audited.	  A	  half	  of	  the	  
respondents	   have	   a	   poor	   image	   of	   the	   authority.	   They	   do	   not	   believe	   they	   can	   be	   helped	  with	   their	  
problems	  and	  therefore	  see	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  to	  call	  and	  ask	  questions	  about	  their	  tax	  reporting.	  Among	  
these	  respondents,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  increase	  compliance.	  Tax	  morale	  is	  increased	  by	  a	  friendly	  and	  proper	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treatment	   but	   if	   the	   STA	   is	   not	   contacted	   by	   the	   taxpayers,	   they	   cannot	   use	   this	   way	   to	   increase	  
compliance.	  
There	  is	  a	  myriad	  of	  motivational,	  non-­‐economic	  factors,	  which	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  decrease	  anticipated	  
noncompliance.	  Such	  factors	  are	  remorse,	  envy,	  guilt	  and	  shame	  (Andreoni	  et	  al	  1998).	  Respondents	  in	  
the	   group	  with	   an	   accounting	   consultant	   feel	   that	   it	   is	  morally	   wrong	   to	   evade	   taxes.	   They	   say	   they	  
would	  feel	  shame	  and	  guilt	  if	  they	  cheated.	  Entrepreneurs	  think	  that	  the	  feeling	  of	  shame	  is	  motivating	  
to	  not	  evade	  tax.	  
Discussions	  with	  respondents	   in	  the	  group	  without	  an	  accountant	  were	  similar.	  Everyone	  in	  this	  group	  
would	   feel	   shame	   if	   they	   cheated	   consciously.	   One	   respondent	   has	   sometimes	   gambled	   in	   his	   tax	  
reporting	   and	   taken	   a	   risk	   not	   reporting	   the	   tax	   correctly.	   However,	   this	   has	   never	   been	   done	   to	  
deliberately	  cheat;	  instead	  it	  depends	  on	  an	  inadequate	  accounting	  knowledge.	  
Participants	  in	  an	  experiment,	  regarding	  tax	  compliance,	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  compliant	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  
participant	  felt	  that	  there	  were	  ways	  to	  avoid	  laws	  and	  regulations.	  More	  cash	  than	  card	  payment	  is	  one	  
example	  when	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  compliance	  was	  decreased	  (Robben	  et	  al	  1990).	  Further	  Robben	  et	  al	  
argues	   that	  noncompliance	   is	  counteracted	   in	  most	  cases	  with	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  detection.	  Participants	   in	  
the	  group	  with	  an	  accountant	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  would	  cheat	  more	  if	  they	  have	  had	  
knowledge	   of	   how	   to	   avoid	   taxation.	   They	   insist	   that	   their	   tax	   morale	   is	   higher	   than	   trying	   to	   find	  
loopholes	  in	  the	  rules	  and	  thus	  pay	  less	  tax.	  
One	   of	   the	   participants	   in	   the	   group	   without	   a	   consultant	   says	   he	   thinks	   it	   is	   unfair	   because	  micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  opportunities	  for	  tax	  planning	  as	  larger	  businesses	  have.	  He	  thinks	  
it	   is	   unfair	   that	   they,	   for	   example,	   can	   give	   group	   contribution	   in	   order	   to	   lower	   their	   tax	   burden.	  
Although	  he	  thinks	  that	   it	   is	  unfair	  he	  still	  does	  not	  want	  to	  cheat.	  But	  he	  thinks	  that	   there	  should	  be	  
more	  tax	  incentives	  for	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs.	  Others	  in	  the	  group	  tell	  us	  that	  they	  would	  not	  cheat	  even	  
if	  they	  would	  know	  about	  ways	  to	  avoid	  paying	  the	  high	  taxes.	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6. Conclusions and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction  
In	  this	  chapter	  the	  study’s	  conclusions	  will	  be	  presented	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  the	  chosen	  questions.	  We	  
give	  the	  answers	  of	  the	  questions	  and	  then	  continue	  with	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
study	   has	   been	   completed	   and	   what	   the	   study	   has	   concluded.	   After	   this,	   a	   discussion	   based	   on	   the	  
author’s	  thoughts	  and	  suggestions	  on	  areas	  for	  further	  research	  will	  follow.	   
6.2 Conclusions  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  describe	  how	  tax	  behavior	  has	  changed	  in	  micro-­‐enterprises	  since	  the	  
audit	   requirement	  was	   removed	   in	   2010.	   The	   study's	   first	   question	  was;	  How has the principal-agent 
relationship changed since the audit requirement was removed?  
The	   study	   shows	   that	   the	   relationship	   has	   changed	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   knowledge	  has	   been	   lost	   in	   the	  
micro-­‐enterprises	  who	  choose	  not	  to	  use	  an	  auditor.	  In	  some	  micro-­‐enterprises,	  this	  reduced	  knowledge	  
is	   covered	  up	  by	   the	   use	   of	   an	   accounting	   consultant,	  while	   others	   choose	   to	  manage	   their	   accounts	  
themselves.	  
Micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   in	   our	   study	   argue	   that	   they	   do	   not	   use	   the	   information	   asymmetry	   existing	  
between	  themselves	  and	  the	  STA.	  Nor	  have	  they	  utilized	  this	  before	  the	  mandatory	  audit	  requirement	  
was	  abolished.	  Because	  of	  the	  reduced	  accounting	  knowledge	  in	  the	  micro-­‐enterprises,	  the	  opportunity	  
for	  moral	  hazard	  also	  decreased.	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  respondents,	  in	  the	  group	  without	  an	  accountant,	  
has	  sometime	  gambled	  in	  his	  tax	  reporting	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  accounting	  knowledge.	  
This	  has	  not	  been	  directly	  demonstrated	  by	  low	  tax	  compliance.	  Micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  tax	  
cheat,	   in	  either	  group.	  However,	  a	   respondent	  without	  an	  accountant	  has	  sometime	  chosen	  to	   take	  a	  
gamble	  while	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  his	  tax	  reporting.	  This	  has	  not	  been	  shown	  in	  the	  group	  with	  an	  
accounting	  consultant,	  as	   these	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   let	   their	   consultants	  manage	   their	  accounts.	  The	  
decline	   in	   knowledge	   due	   to	   the	   changed	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   has	   therefore	   affected	   tax	  
compliance.	   This	   is	   because	   many	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   without	   an	   accountant	   consultant	   choose	   to	  
take	  a	  chance	  and	  send	  in	  their	  tax	  reports	  despite	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  both	  accounting	  records,	  and	  
how	  to	  complete	  the	  tax	  forms.	  
The	  lack	  of	  an	  auditor	  has	  affected	  the	  group	  that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  more	  than	  the	  
group	  who	  does.	  If	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  themselves,	  or	  someone	  close	  to	  them,	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  
necessary	   accounting	   knowledge	   to	   handle	   their	   accounting,	   their	   tax	   reporting	   suffers.	   Respondents	  
who	  have	  chosen	  to	  manage	  their	  accounts	  themselves	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  in	  no	  need	  of	  an	  accountant.	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However,	   most	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   would	   benefit	   from	   using	   an	   accounting	   consultant.	   Previous	  
research	  has	  shown	  that	  buying	  in	  external	  knowledge	  has	  led	  to	  increased	  sales	  and	  survival	  of	  family	  
firms	   (Barbera	  and	  Hasso	  2013).	  Our	   study	  argues	   that	   this	  also	  applies	   to	  micro-­‐enterprises,	  because	  
micro-­‐enterprises	   are	   similar	   to	   small	   businesses	   regarding	   management,	   size	   and	   regulation.	   Our	  
empirical	   evidence	   has	   also	   shown	   that	   the	   group	   who	   uses	   an	   accounting	   consultant	   also	   uses	   its	  
accounting	  for	  more	  business	  decisions	  than	  the	  group	  without	  an	  accountant.	  
However,	  if	  a	  micro-­‐enterprise	  employs	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  
businesses'	   accounting	   knowledge	   is	   sufficient.	   The	   relationship	   between	   a	   small	   business	   and	   its	  
accountant	  tends	  to	  be	  long	  term,	  no	  matter	  if	  you	  are	  fully	  satisfied	  with	  your	  consultant's	  work	  or	  not	  
(Marriott	   and	   Marriott	   2000).	   Our	   empirical	   evidence	   shows	   that	   this	   also	   applies	   to	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs.	  If	  your	  accountant	  is	  doing	  a	  bad	  job,	  it's	  very	  possible	  that	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneur	  will	  
keep	  him/her	  employed	  despite	   this.	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   the	  use	  of	   an	  accounting	   consultant	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  result	  in	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  business's	  sales.	  
The	   second	   question	   in	   this	   study	   was;	   How does a changed principal-agent relationship affect the 
legitimacy of tax authorities and micro-entrepreneurs?  
The	  micro-­‐enterprises	  view	  of	  the	  STA	  has	  changed,	  but	  not	  because	  of	  the	  audit	  abolishment.	  There	  has	  
been	  a	  change	  in	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship,	  but	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  change	  did	  not	  affect	  legitimacy	  
towards	  the	  STA.	  However,	  the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  themselves	  believe	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  mandatory	  
audit	  requirement	  has	  resulted	  in	  that	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  has	  declined.	  This	  is	  from	  stakeholders	  such	  
as	  banks	  and	   investors.	  They	  also	  believe	  that	   the	  voluntary	  use	  of	  an	  accountant	   today	  may	   increase	  
the	  legitimacy	  towards	  a	  micro-­‐enterprise	  from	  a	  bank's	  or	  investor's	  perspective.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  
research	   showing	   that	   giving	   out	   voluntary	   information	   can	   achieve	   a	   higher	   legitimacy	   (Bansal	   and	  
Clelland	  2004).	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  between	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  and	  
the	   STA	   has	   changed	   since	   the	   audit	   abolishment.	   This	   is	   by	   loss	   of	   knowledge	   in	  micro-­‐enterprises,	  
primarily	  among	  businesses	  that	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  bring	  in	  external	  knowledge	  in	  form	  of	  an	  accountant.	  
This	   has	   left	   tax	   reporting	   suffering,	   since	   tax	   compliance	   has	   decreased	   in	   the	   group	   without	   an	  
accountant,	  and	  could	  be	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  alone	  stand	  for	  39	  percent	  (STA	  
2013)	  of	  the	  nation	  inaccurate	  taxation.	  	  
However,	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   have	   not	   resulted	   in	   a	   deterioration	   of	  
legitimacy	   towards	   the	   STA	   from	   the	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs'	   point	   of	   view.	   The	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  
themselves	   believe	   their	   own	   legitimacy	   has	   been	   reduced	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   banks	   and	   investors.	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  can	  be	  helped	  by	  voluntarily	  choosing	  to	  use	  an	  auditor	  despite	  not	  legally	  requiring	  
doing	  so.	  	  
Our	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  inaccurate	  taxation	  among	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  in	  Sweden	  
has	  increased	  due	  to	  a	  change	  in	  tax	  behavior.	  It	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  handle	  their	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accounting	   and	   tax	   reporting	   that	   has	   changed,	   not	   the	   wish	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing,	   i.e.	   the	   tax	  
compliance.	   Among	   the	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  who	   have	   chosen	   to	   bring	   in	   external	   knowledge	   in	   the	  
form	   of	   an	   accounting	   consultant,	   the	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   has	   been	   reduced.	   Therefor	   the	   audit	  
abolishment	  has	  not	  had	   the	  same	  effect	   in	   these	  businesses	  compared	   to	   those	  choosing	   to	  manage	  
their	  accounting	  and	  tax	  reporting	  themselves.	  	  
6.3 Discussion 
This	  study	  was	  conducted	  in	  2014,	  while	  the	  new	  law	  regarding	  dispensation	  of	  the	  audit	  duty	  for	  small	  
businesses	  was	  introduced	  in	  2010.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  law	  has	  been	  valid	  for	  an	  optimal	  time	  passed	  
for	   this	  study	  to	  be	  carried	  through	   is	  debatable.	  An	  optimal	   time	  passed	   for	   this	  study	  to	  have	  taken	  
place	  is	  very	  hard,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  determine.	  Three,	  five,	  ten	  or	  twenty	  years...	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  
study	  is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  critical	  for	  this	  decision.	  We	  do	  however	  believe	  that	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  
conduct	   further	  studies	   in	  the	  future	  relating	  to	  the	  change	  of	   law	  to	  have	  been	  valid	   for	  a	   long	  time.	  
Nevertheless,	  we	  ourselves	  have	  not	  noticed	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  passed	  since	  the	  new	  regulations,	  
four	  years,	  has	  been	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  study.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  our	  conclusions	  would	  have	  been	  affected	  
if	   the	   study	  was	  made	   a	   further	   five	   years	   in	   the	   future.	   Perhaps	   the	   problems	   found	   among	  micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	  who	  do	  not	   currently	  use	  an	  accountant	  would	  have	  been	   solved.	  Perhaps	   the	   tax	  gap	  
amongst	  micro-­‐enterprises	  would	  have	  declined.	  And	  maybe	   current	   regulations	  would	  have	   changed	  
again,	   either	   through	   simplified	   rules	   for	   tax	   reporting,	   educational	   requirements	   of	   micro-­‐
entrepreneurs	  or	  mandatory	  use	  of	  an	  accountant.	  	  These	  thoughts	  are	  only	  speculations	  about	  possible	  
future	  changes	  that	  have	  risen	  while	  this	  study	  was	  conducted.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  if	  any	  of	  these	  
changes	   were	   implemented,	   and	   the	   current	   problem	   with	   tax	   reporting	   and	   accounting	   in	   micro-­‐
enterprises	  without	  an	  accountant	  were	  more	  or	  less	  eliminated,	  a	  study	  similar	  to	  ours	  would	  not	  have	  
taken	  place.	  	  
Furthermore,	  reflections	  occurred	  on	  a	  more	  rigorous	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  in	  the	  study,	  
i.e.	   micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   with	   and	   without	   an	   accountant.	   However,	   this	   has	   been	   breached	   and	  
resolved	   through	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   two	   groups	   with	   more	   or	   less	   differences	   around	   the	   different	  
themes.	  The	  study	  aimed	  to	  describe	  how	  tax	  behavior	  amongst	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  has	  changed	  since	  
the	  audit	   requirement	  was	   removed	   in	  2010.	  We	   felt	   that	   the	  point	  of	   use	  of	   the	   two	  groups	  was	   to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  opinions	  of	  how	  micro-­‐enterprises	  managed	  their	  accounts	  and	  tax	  reporting	  in	  different	  
ways	  emerged	  from	  the	  study.	  Not	  to	  strictly	  compare	  the	  differences	  between	  them.	  
A	   thought	   in	   retrospect	   has	   been	   that	   even	   as	  we	  have	  ensured	   that	   our	   respondents	   are	   from	  both	  
businesses	   with	   and	   without	   an	   external	   accounting	   consultant,	   we	   could	   have	   ensured	   that	   the	  
businesses	  were	   located	   in	  central	  Gothenburg	  city,	  as	  well	  as	  at	   less	  populated	   locations	  outside	   the	  
city	  center.	  This	   is	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  differences	   in	  views	  on	  tax	  reporting	  and	  the	  STA	  were	  found	  in	  
the	   study.	   In	   our	   case,	   we	   have	   limited	   ourselves	   to	   neither	   one	   nor	   the	   other,	   but	   have	   received	   a	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distribution	  that	  we	  are	  satisfied	  with	  among	  our	  respondents.	  But	  it	  had	  possibly	  been	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  
greater	  relevance	  to	  the	  study	  if	  we	  had	  also	  ensured	  opinions	  from	  different	  sized	  communities.	  
6.4 Further research 
Since	   this	   study	   has	   been	   exploratory	  we	   encourage	   further	   research	   in	   the	   area.	  We	  would	   suggest	  
further	   studies	   to	   use	   a	   quantitative	   approach,	   such	   as	   a	   questionnaire,	   as	   well	   as	   qualitative	  
information.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  do	  a	  similar	  study	  in	  ten	  years	  or	  so,	  to	  see	  if	  the	  result	  of	  the	  
study	  differs	  when	  the	  change	  of	  law	  regarding	  audit	  requirement	  has	  been	  active	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  
time.	  	  
Furthermore,	  we	  believe	   it	  would	  be	   interesting	   to	  do	  a	   follow	  up	  on	   the	  group	   that	  does	  not	  use	  an	  
accountant,	   since	   we	   have	   found	   that	   more	   problems	   have	   occurred	   in	   this	   group	   than	   the	   one	  
employing	   an	   accountant.	   We	   would	   like	   to	   know	   how	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	   in	   the	   future	   decide	   to	  
handle	  their	  accounting	  and	  tax	  reporting.	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Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
Introductory	  questions	  	  1. How	  long	  has	  your	  business	  existed?	  	  2. Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  accounting	  and	  tax	  reporting?	  	  	  3. What	  kind	  of	  educational	  background	  has	  the	  person	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  accounting	  and	  tax	  reporting?	  Previous	  experience?	  	  	  
Accounting	  4. Do	  you	  use	  an	  accounting	  consultant	  today?	  	  	  5. What	  reason	  do	  you	  have	  for	  using	  an	  accountant	  today?	  	  6. Have	  you	  always	  used	  the	  same	  accountant,	  or	  have	  you	  ever	  switched?	  	  	  7. Do	  you	  experience	  that	  your	  accountant	  is	  doing	  a	  good	  job?	  	  	  8. What	  qualities	  do	  you	  perceive	  as	  positive	  of	  a	  consultant?	  	  	  9. How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  relationship	  between	  you	  and	  your	  accountant?	  	  	  10. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  a	  knowledge	  gap	  between	  you	  and	  your	  accountant?	  	  11. Do	  you	  use	  your	  accountings	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  business?	  	  
Legitimacy	  theory	  12. What	  is	  your	  view	  of	  the	  Swedish	  tax	  agency	  as	  an	  authority?	  	  	  13. Do	  you	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  STA?	  	  	  14. Have	  your	  view	  of	  the	  STA	  changed	  the	  last	  10	  years?	  	  	  15. Have	   your	   legitimacy	   towards	   the	   STA	   changed	   because	   of	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   audit	  requirement?	  	  	  	  16. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  you	  can	  make	  contact	  with	  the	  STA	  regarding	  tax	  reporting	  and	  accounting	  in	  your	  own	  business?	  	  	  17. Do	   you	   feel	   that	   your	   own	   legitimacy	   (from	   different	   stakeholders,	   lenders)	   has	   been	  affected	  since	  the	  abolition?	  	  18. What	  do	  you	  think	  about	  the	  opportunity	  of	  free	  audit?	  	  	  
Tax	  compliance	  19. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  follow	  the	  tax	  regulation?	  	  20. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  the	  rules	  and	  laws	  change	  too	  frequently?	  21. Do	  you	  experience	  difficulties	  filing	  a	  correct	  tax	  report?	  	  22. Have	   your	   willingness	   to	   comply	   with	   laws	   and	   regulations	   changed	   since	   the	   audit	  abolition?	  	  23. What	  aspects	  of	  tax	  reporting	  do	  you	  experience	  as	  difficult?	  	  24. Have	  you	  contacted	  the	  STA	  with	  questions?	  How	  were	  you	  treated	  in	  that	  case?	  Did	  you	  get	  an	  answer	  to	  your	  questions?	  	  25. Do	  you	  view	  accounting	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  example	  in	  business	  decisions?	  	  26. Are	  you	  worried	  that	  you	  will	  be	  scrutinized	  by	  the	  STA?	  	  
